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Regulating the Cloud: A Comparative Analysis
of the Current and Proposed Privacy
Frameworks in Canada and the European
Union
David Krebs*
ABSTRACT
Cloud computing is a growing phenomenon and promises greater efficiency
and reduced-cost computing. However, some of the basic technological and business-related features of the Cloud are at odds with personal data protection laws.
Canada and the European Union share similar core values related to privacy/data
protection, and both regions aim to increase their competitiveness regarding cloud
computing. Having these two similarities in mind, this paper explores the current
legal and stakeholder landscape in Canada and the European Union with respect to
cloud computing, data protection and how adoption of the model can be advanced.
The analysis shows that neither of the frameworks is entirely compatible with
cloud computing in its current application. Canada’s legal landscape is slightly
more hospitable, but is lacking direction from regulators, while the EU’s non-harmonized and restrictive framework presents a challenge for cloud proliferation.
Relevant stakeholders have diverging views on how data protection in the Cloud
should be approached and 2012 will be a year during which these views will likely
be debated in detail, in particular in response to the draft proposal of the European
Commission on a new data protection framework. This paper concludes with distilling four possible options in this regard.

I. INTRODUCTION
The cloud sort of is part of that Internet gift. It’s the next step, it’s the next
phase, it’s the next transition, and depending on who you are, and how you
think, you could say the cloud started five years ago, ten years ago. You can
go back to 1969, if you want, and say that the cloud started 40 years ago,
because the microprocessor and the Internet are the gifts that just keep on
giving us the chance, and the opportunities to make a difference.1

Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer’s comments provide an indication of why everyone is talking about “the Cloud”. Cloud computing has been hailed as promising

*
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J.D. University of Saskatchewan. LL.M. candidate, Stockholm University. Member of
the Bar of Alberta. Currently working in Uppsala, Sweden.
Microsoft, “Remarks made by Steve Ballmer, CEO, at a speech at the University of
Washington”, March 4, 2010, online: Microsoft <http://www.microsoft.com
/presspass/exec/steve/2010/03-04cloud.mspx>.
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to be a major part of the future of information communications technology2 and as
a fundamental trend of the Internet — itself recently described as the “most disruptive technology we will have seen in history”.3 Others have referred to it as nothing
but a fancy term for time-sharing models that have been around since the 1960’s.4
The other side of the debate lies in the weighing of the benefits and dangers involved in deploying the model, in particular when it comes to sensitive data. Champions of the Cloud, like Microsoft’s CEO, see it as having unparalleled potential of
revolutionizing the way in which we communicate and store and access data,
software programs and technology infrastructure,5 whereas skeptics view it as a
large-scale threat to personal privacy and information security.6
Whatever view one shares, the protection of electronically stored personal data
is one of the most salient topics in the discussions surrounding cloud computing
and how, when, and if it should be widely adopted. In Western jurisdictions, privacy and data protection legislation was conceived, drafted and implemented
before the term “cloud computing” came into existence. It was, therefore, not designed to necessarily accommodate situations where personal data is moved freely
from one jurisdiction to another (often unbeknownst to the individual), accessed
over the Internet or where it shares server space with other parties, all of which
may be the case where an organization stores data with a cloud service provider
(“CSP”).
This paper explores how stakeholders in Canada and in the European Union
(“EU”) are evaluating data protection7 and the particular legal challenges of storing
personal data in the Cloud. This comparison is of interest because of Canada’s rela-
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Expert Group Report for the European Commission: Information Society and Media,
Jeffrey, K. and Neidecker-Lutz, B (eds.), “The Future of Cloud Computing: Opportunities for European Cloud Computing Beyond 2010”, online: European Commission
<http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/ssai/Docs/cloud-report-final.pdf>.
Comments made by Eric Schmidt, CEO at Google, during the Activate 2010 Conference referring to how the Internet has turned an economy of scarcity to one of
abundance, online: The Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/video/2010/
jul/02/google-eric-schmidt-activate>.
See Bruce Schneier, “Be Careful When You Put Your Trust in Cloud Computing”, The
Guardian, (June 4, 2009), online: The Guardian <http://www.
guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/jun/04/bruce-schneier-cloud-computing>.
See Schmidt Comments, supra and Future of Cloud Computing, supra.
See Christopher Soghoian, “Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era” (2009) Vol. 8 J. On Telecomm & High Tech. L.
359 at 361.
This paper will be using terminology from both the Canadian and European legal
realm. That is, the terms “privacy protection” and “personal information” will be used
alongside the European terminology “data protection” and “personal data” and where
in Canada one speaks of an individual’s personal information, under European law this
person is referred to as a “data subject”. The same goes for the Canadian terminology
of “using, collecting and disclosing” of information being referred to generally as
“processing”.
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tionship with the “EU” and the mutually shared values on privacy.8 Canada’s private sector privacy legislation, the Personal Information Protection and Electronics Documents Act9 (“PIPEDA”), was implemented to conform to European
privacy legislation10 (and has been deemed as offering “adequate” protection under
the European Data Protection Directive),11 and the developments in Europe are
therefore an important gauge for Canadian policy and business interests. Conversely, Canada has been viewed as providing a third alternative to data protection12 compared with the US industry self-regulating approach and the more strict
regulatory environment of the EU, and may therefore be of interest to European
legislators, as well as to industry wishing to use service providers in Canada. Both
regions are also vying for a spot among the leaders in the ICT arena and are competing as desirable locations for the growing cloud computing market. The legal
framework in each country and region may partially determine where cloud providers will move and where the technology will be embraced.13
Within the EU, particular attention will be paid to the current debate in Germany and, to a lesser extent, Sweden; Germany, because it is Europe’s largest
economy and a leader in the ICT field in Europe, and it has one of the most successful privacy regimes14 and Sweden because it was the first country to enact data
protection legislation in Europe15 and it is another European leader in the ICT
industry.
Currently, the data protection regulatory framework in EU Member States, let
alone across the globe, is not harmonized and, in fact, quite fragmented. CSPs have
been making it known that this needs to change if cloud computing is to reach
across-the-board acceptance, and trust. Organizations and providers will need to
know their respective obligations in order to be compliant in their operations and
this in turn will ultimately affect willingness to adopt the technology.16 Conversely,
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The similarities have been well-documented. See e.g. Michael Zimmer, “Privacy Protection in the Next Digital Decade: “Trading Up” or a “Race to the Bottom”?” in The
Next Digital Decade at 477.
S.C., 2000, c.5.
See, e.g. Jeremy Warner, “The Right to Oblivion: Data Retention from Canada to Europe in Three Backward Steps”, [2005] 2 UOLTJ 75.
Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31–39 (EC) (Oct. 24, 1995), online:
EurLex
<http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L
0046:en:HTML>.
Lee Bygrave, “Privacy Protection in a Global Context”, Scandinavian Studies in IT
Law, ed. Peter Wahlgren (Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law: 2004, Vol. 47) at
340.
See Michael Geist, “Location Matters Up in the Cloud”, Toronto Star (December 10,
2010) online: Toronto Star <http://www.thestar.com/business/article/901068 — geistlocation-matters-up-in-the-cloud#article>.
Bygrave, supra at 345.
Datalagen, 1973.
Jeremy Kirk, “Ballmer Calls for Clearer Data Rules from Europe”, PC World (November 4, 2010), online: PC World <http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter
/article/209722/ballmer_calls_for_clearer_data_rulesfrom_europe.html>.
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Privacy Commissioners are among those who have voiced concerns about the
model and whether or not cloud computing can ever be compliant with the current
data protection frameworks as they exist, inter alia, in Canada and Europe.
In order to analyze these matters appropriately, this paper is divided into four
parts. The first part will provide a brief overview of the cloud model as understood
in 2011. The second part will canvass the threats cloud computing poses to electronically stored personal information by describing the model’s features underlying these threats.17 The discussion will then move on to describe and contrast the
current landscape, consisting of laws, and stakeholder proposals and opinions relevant to the central issues surrounding the protection of personal information in
cloud computing. The ultimate goal will then be to compare, contrast, and analyze
the current and potential future landscape and how it might affect the adoption of a
feasible framework for the protection of personal data stored in the Cloud.
Much has been written over the past three years about data protection in the
Cloud and the intended contribution of this paper is not to make an exhaustive
inventory of the Cloud’s threats to personal privacy. It is to summarize, analyze and
contrast the current legal landscapes in Canada and in Europe in order to distill
commonalities and differences which may then enable an enlightened look, into
2012 and beyond, of how the regulation of data protection in the Cloud might
develop.

II. THE NATURE OF CLOUD COMPUTING
To state that there are more than a few definitions of cloud computing would
be a great understatement. Cloud computing is an “evolving paradigm”18 and its
definition will change, very likely from time when this article was commenced until it was finalized.19 For current purposes suffice it to say that, essentially, cloud
services include the provision of scalable (adjusted according to need) services that
allow individuals and businesses to access and use, via the Internet, software and
hardware, which is managed or owned by third party service providers.20 Instead of
keeping information stored locally on the home desktop or on a server in the office,
customers using cloud services store their information remotely, usually on shared
servers owned by others, and there are often more than one CSP involved in this

17
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19
20

The Canadian definition of personal information means information related to an identifiable individual, the European Data Protection Directive speaks of “[. . .]”. In this
paper I will be using the term “personal information” as referring to all jurisdictions,
pointing out potential differences where applicable.
Peter Mell and Tim Grance, “The NIST definition of Cloud Computing, Version 15”,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, online: NIST
lt;http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing/cloud-def-v15.doc>.
In fact, the NIST has recently released an updated version of the definition discussed
herein.
Also see Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Draft Report on the 2010
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s Consultations on Online Tracking,
Profiling and Targeting and Cloud Computing”, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada, online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/resource/consultations/report_2010_e.cfm#ftnref32>.
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process (i.e. second or third-tier subcontractor CSPs). In terms of its application,
the sky (no pun intended) is the limit. Small and medium sized firms, large corporations, governments, as well as law firms are all types of organizations that are or
may in the not-too-distant future be using cloud services.

(a) Benefits of Cloud Computing
Cloud computing can be categorized as SaaS, PaaS and IaaS, referring, respectively, to Software, Platform and Infrastructure “as a service”. Broadly speaking, IaaS is a service that provides access to hardware via the Internet, SaaS is
usually provided by allowing access to software applications via the Internet (rather
than installing these on internal hardware), while PaaS allows the customer to write
and execute software code on the Cloud infrastructure. These services can be combined or provided separately.21 A customer using SaaS leaves much of the control
of his technology (and data) to the CSP while retaining relatively more of this control using IaaS and PaaS.22 This is called choosing levels of “abstraction”.
The Cloud can be deployed in different ways either as a private (internal or
external), community,23 public or a hybrid cloud.24 The way in which the Cloud
itself is deployed is of crucial importance to the nature and extent of the related
privacy concerns. With the public cloud model, the infrastructure is available to the
general public. One or more clouds may be stored on the same physical server and
accessed through virtualization. This is a central feature but also one that creates
the highest level of concern. With the private internal model, cloud technologies
are deployed across an organization and the customer retains all control over security, hardware and software, whereas with an external model this control is passed to
the CSP. A hybrid model is a model that exists but for which no standardized definition has been determined as of date.25 Essentially, it combines other cloud mod-
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For a more detailed description, see NIST, supra.
Joep Ruiter and Martijn Warnier, “Privacy Regulations for Cloud Computing Compliance and Implementation in Theory and Practice” (2010) at 3, online: IIDS
<http://www.iids.org/aigaion/? page=publication&kind=single&ID=316>.
“The cloud infrastructure is shared by several organizations and supports a specific
community that has shared concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and
compliance considerations). It may be managed by the organizations or a third party
and may exist on premise or off premise.” See NIST, supra.
Also see Wikipedia “Cloud Computing” online: Wikipedia
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloud_computing#Private_cloud>.
Ibid: “There is some confusion over the term “Hybrid” when applied to the cloud — a
standard definition of the term “Hybrid Cloud” has not yet emerged. The term “Hybrid Cloud” has been used to mean either two separate clouds joined together (public,
private, internal or external), or a combination of virtualized cloud server instances
used together with real physical hardware. The most correct definition of the term
“Hybrid Cloud” is probably the use of physical hardware and virtualized cloud server
instances together to provide a single common service.” Compare with definition in
Ruiter, supra: “Hybrid Clouds are a combination of the other Cloud types. In a hybrid
Cloud, organizations use a CSP in cases where additional resources are required.” and
that of the NIST: “The cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or more clouds
(private, community, or public) that remain unique entities but are bound together by

34

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[10 C.J.L.T.]

els so one ends up either with two of them joined together or with virtual infrastructures that are combined with physical hardware.
The benefits of using cloud technologies, or at least the extent thereof, are not
entirely uncontested,26 but mainly relate to cost, efficiency and flexibility of use.
Customers using cloud technologies do not need to make capital investments such
as for networks and hardware but rather pay on a needs basis. This also provides a
related benefit of the flexibility to use services ad hoc, when they are needed
(scalability/on-demand services).27 These benefits are derived from, inter alia, the
pooling of resources and virtualization. That is, different organizations, using separate cloud infrastructures, share the same hardware but only use the resources they
require at a given time. Although somewhat contradictory to the discussion herein
regarding the biggest threats to data, the Cloud may actually promise increased
security for some businesses, especially small and medium sized businesses that
may not have otherwise had the resources to invest in security measures.28 Similarly, some believe that privacy may actually be improved by cloud computing
through increased use of and innovation regarding privacy-by-design efforts as well
as the data protection capabilities of CSPs as compared with customers.29
The reasons underlying the Cloud’s advantages are closely related to its drawbacks and the concerns related to its use, particularly with respect to data protection. The model in and of itself has characteristics that cannot be amended in order
to protect data because it is those characteristics which make the Cloud viable in
the first place.

(b) The Threats to Personal Information
It is trite to say that personal information is at risk of becoming compromised
no matter where it is stored. Whatever risks exist, they are increased when information is transacted and stored in the Cloud. The threats most commonly associated
with cloud computing are unlawful access by computer hackers, lawful interception/access by governments (not to mention covert government action), service
continuity, rights to and responsibility for data, international transfer of
data/jurisdiction and of course various issues surrounding security of clouds in gen-

26

27
28
29

standardized or proprietary technology that enables data and application portability
(e.g., cloud bursting for load-balancing between clouds), supra.”
See e.g. Mimecast, “Cloud Barometer Survey”, Mimecast, online: Mimecast
<http://www.mimecast.com/barometerresearch2010, and Office of the Information and
Privacy Commissioner, “Reaching for the Clouds”, online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada www.priv.gc.ca/information/pub/cc_201003_e.cfm>.
See NIST’s description of On-demand self-service, Resource pooling. Rapid elasticity,
Measured Service, supra.
Andrew DeVore, “Cloud Computing: Privacy Storm on the Horizon?” (20. Alb. L.J.
Sci. & Tech. 365, 2010) at 366.
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Draft Report on the 2010 Office of
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s Consultations on Online Tracking, Profiling
and Targeting and Cloud Computing” (October 25, 2010), online: Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada <http://www.priv.gc.ca/resource/consultations/report
_2010_e.cfm>.
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eral, which is considered the biggest overall threat in the Cloud.30 More particularly, attacks on personal data, and therefore also on the privacy of the individual,
have been categorized as one of the biggest threats to cloud computing by members
of the cloud computing industry.31 Data is more susceptible to becoming “compromised” due to the number of interactions online as well as the architecture and
technology of the Cloud itself. This section does not intend to provide an exhaustive list of all threats posed by the Cloud but rather it will distill an overview of the
most common issues that arise from the use of cloud computing, being threats
stemming from the architecture of the model and those arising out of business decisions made by CSPs and their customers and suppliers.

(i) Inherent Features
As we have noted previously, the cloud model is based on the sharing of scalable resources. “Multi-tenancy” is one essential inherent feature of this model and
means that a number of virtual machines are hosted on one physical server. Many
individual computers (from potentially many parts of the world) communicate with
the main terminal which is located at a separate location. Two distinct concerns
have been noted here. One cloud may become the target by another sitting on the
same server, something known as a “side-channel attack”.32 The second related
issue is unauthorized access to data by law enforcement officials. If one virtual
machine is the subject of an authorized (or unauthorized) seizure all other clouds
sitting on the physical machine will also be seized and could potentially be accessed.33 The issues accompanying this threat are twofold: one being that there is a
potential breach or privacy (and related matters such as potential disclosure of intellectual property and other sensitive data) and the second being interrupted access, which is both of legal and business concern.
Another feature is the so-called “Cloud stack”,34 whereby layers are stacked
on top of one another. Each layer may involve the provisioning of services by a
separate CSP. The obvious threat here is that more and more parties are involved in
the process of collecting, using, storing and disclosing (personal) data. With each
new party involved and with each layer of abstraction, the data subject (individual)
loses part control over his personal data. Also, each layer of the stack could be
hosted in a different location and/or jurisdiction, and thus, more and more of the

30

31
32

33
34

There is an abundance of commentary available about these issues online. For a good
overview of the main issues see Cloud Security Alliance “Top Threats to Cloud computing, Version 1.0”, March 2010, online: Cloud Security Alliance
www.cloudsecurityalliance.org/topthreats/csathreats.v1.0.pdf.
Ibid at 12.
See Ken Choo, “Cloud Computing: Challenges and Future Directions”, Australian
Government: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No. 400 (October, 2010).
In such an attack, the cache of the target machine may be monitored, and thus data
taken, quite easily after mapping the internal cloud structure to identify where the target cloud resides on the server.
Ibid.
See e.g. “Cloud Stack”, Wkipedia, online at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Cloud_
Computing-_Stack.svg, last accessed on January 10, 2011>.
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control over data is given up by the client to the cloud provider(s), who themselves
may not always be able to easily locate the data within the cloud structure.35 However, threats to privacy and security do not only emerge in the Cloud because of the
nature of the model, they also arise because of the business decisions the CSP and
customer make relating to their contracting relationship and the technology used.

(ii) Business Decisions
CSPs and their customers are free to contract on some of the terms they wish
that are unaffected by the technology of the Cloud. These business decisions will
either increase or decrease the threats to personal data. As an example, encryption
technologies are by some experts36 seen as a viable way to protect data in the
Cloud. CSPs could decide to use encryption or they could decide to send information over the Internet in its original form, for anyone intercepting the communication to be able to read. In practice, encryption technologies are not always utilized
appropriately, or at all, due to various reasons relating to cost or lack of system
sophistication, or simply because industry has no real incentive to provide for network encryption.37 When logging on to Facebook’s site, the user after logging in is
still connecting with an (unsecure) “http” rather than a encrypted “https” connection.38 The reason for this is not entirely clear. This may be due to the lack of
incentive (or lack of perceived consumer demand) or that pages take longer to load
when encrypted, but it may also be that some Internet based business models depend on the lack of encryption for advertising and data mining purposes.39 Other
examples of where cloud-specific measures may be the cause of privacy issues are
insufficient authentication, authorization, and audit controls; operational failures;
data center reliability and inappropriate disaster recovery.40 If the Cloud is not protected in line with the latest security technology it leaves data vulnerable to both
lawful and unlawful access.
From a business perspective, the chosen contractual arrangements may also
pose a threat to data stored in the Cloud. For example, an agreement may provide
for customer data to be disclosed under certain circumstances but not put the obligation on the CSP to notify the customer if such disclosure was to occur (provided
that the law allows for such an arrangement).41 Another scenario can arise where
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IBM, “IBM Point of View: Security and Cloud Computing (Whitepaper)” (November
2009), online IBM <http://www.ibm.com/common/ssi/fcgi-bin/ssialiasinfotype
=SA&subtype=WH&appname=SWGE_TI_SE_USEN&htmlfid=TIW14045USEN
&attachment=TIW14045USEN_HR.PDF>.
Refer to discussion infra.
Caught in the Cloud, supra note 3 at 392.
This is due to change, although consumers will have to change the setting themselves,
see Matthew Schwartz, “Facebook boosts security”, Information Week, online:
Information Week, <http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/app-security/
showArticle.jhtml?articleID=229100364>.
Ibid at 395 ff.
Top Ten Threats, supra note 21.
See e.g. Amazon, “Amazon Web Services Customer Agreement”, section 10.2, online:
Amazon aws.amazon.com/agreement/:
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contractual arrangements are subject to change (much like many Terms of Use or
privacy policies online) without notice to the customer. At signing, the customer
may have been onside his legal duties with respect to personal data under his control but if terms, such as where data is stored, change without notice compliance
with privacy laws vanish.42
As we have seen, there are many different models for which the Cloud can be
used. With the public cloud model, data is often stored in a third country43 and, if
such is the case, there occurs a transfer of data from one jurisdiction to another.
Data belonging to one organization (and the personal information of individuals
within that organization), which is entrusted to the Cloud, could be stored on the
same server as that of another organization, which may or may not be based in
another jurisdiction. That is, the physical location of the server, holding data of
individuals from countries A and B, might be in country C.
The private cloud set-up may also be such that data is stored off-site and in
another country, but this is not necessarily the case. Generally speaking, a private
cloud will be less susceptible to the threats to personal data stored thereon than will
a public cloud, and a hybrid cloud infrastructure will lie somewhere in the middle
of the security scale. The threats to personal information can then be said to in-or
decreased on account of (business) decisions, such as preferring one cloud model to
the other, deciding on the type — and location — of cloud provider or the level of
abstraction in terms of the layers within the Cloud (i.e. choosing IaaS, PaaS, SaaS
or all three in some form).

(c) Technology and Policy-based Solutions
As will be discussed later, there are currently many proposals surrounding the
black letter of data protection laws that would suit the cloud model. But this is not
the only, or possibly the best, way of protecting personal data. This paper will not
explore technological solutions in detail (especially from a technical perspective)
but it is important to describe the main methods currently being discussed in Canada, the EU, and elsewhere in this context to understand some of the proposals
made from a legal standpoint.
One technology-based solution is data encryption, where personal data is en-

42

43

We will not disclose Your Content, except: (i) if you expressly authorize us to do in connection with your use of the Services; or (ii) as
necessary to provide the Services to you, or to comply with the Agreement or the request of a governmental or regulatory body, subpoenas
or court orders.
As an example, where data is hosted in cloud the physical location of which moves
from one jurisdiction to another and the second jurisdiction is not compliant with those
laws the customer is subject to (transfer of data outside of the EU To jurisdiction not
deemed “adequate”).
See e.g. iWire, “Microsoft Calls for APEC Harmony”, October 21, 2010, iWire, online:
iWire <http://www.itwire.com/it-policy-news/government-tech-policy/42599
-microsoft-calls-for-apec-cloud-harmony?start=1>, where it is stated that Microsoft
Australia is said to be storing Australians’ data in the Cloud with data of that Cloud
stored in Singapore.
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crypted before it is sent into the Cloud. This may be an effective way of protecting
data in IaaS and PaaS applications but in SaaS models, it may render the data
unusable for the CSP.44 As will be described in more detail in 3.1.3., the “privacyby-design” model attempts to address this issue by introducing external verification
and authentication methods so that encrypted data can be accessed and used by
CSPs.
From a general policy perspective, some, including industry, advocate a usebased model, whereby personal information’s legitimate use is central, and not
“privacy” worries.45 Instead of aiming at limiting use and curbing the market for
information, it should rather be embraced. Closely tied to this method is the transparency and industry-standards approach, which is being advocated by industry
players. Another approach that has come to the forefront recently is the “audit approach”,46 which aims to enforce accountability through rigid electronic monitoring and enforcement of breaches. Personal data ownership, that is, attaching property rights to personal information, has also been widely debated,47 advocated and
also dismissed by some. So far, personal information has not been deemed “property” either in Canada or in the EU.

III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK, PROPOSALS AND VIEWS
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (“OPC”) has distilled a
list of nine so-called “privacy risks of Cloud Computing”:48 jurisdiction, creation
of new data streams, security, data intrusion, lawful access, processing, misuse of
processing data, permanence of data and ownership of data. Regulating trans-border flows of data from country to country has also been cited as a central issue.49
Peter Schaar, Information and Privacy Commissioner for Germany, considers the
main issue to be that neither the data subject nor the data controller may know
where data is located at any given time50 and that, on a base level, privacy laws are
not able to cope with this model at all. Industry actors have maintained that the core
issues surrounding cloud computing and data protection are related to security and
lack of transparency of security practices,51 and cohesive, consistent, and harmo-
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Privacy Regulations for Cloud Computing, supra at 9.
Larry Downes, “A Market Approach to Privacy Policy”, in Berin Szoka and Adam
Marcus, eds., The Next Digital Decade: Essays on the Future of the Internet, (TechFreedom: 2010) at 524–26.
Michael Zimmer, supra, at 502.
For a pro and con debate, compare Michael Zimmer, supra and Lawrence Lessig, Code
2.0, (Basic Books: New York, 2006) on this topic.
Reaching for the Clouds at 5-6.
For a comprehensive discussion of transborder data flows, see Christopher Kuner,
“Regulation of Transborder Data Flows under Data Protection and Privacy Law”
(TILT Law & Technology Working Paper, No. 016/2010), October 2010, Version 1.0.
Peter Schaar, “Data Protection Must not Disappear in the Cloud” (July 19, 2010), Bund
fur Datenschutz, online: Bund fur Datenschutz <http://www.bfdi.bund.de/cln
_136/EN/PublicRelations/SpeechesAndInterviews/blog/DatenschutzDarfNichtIn
DerCloudVerschwinden.html>.
IBM Whitepaper, supra, at 5.
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nized regulatory frameworks.52
For the purposes of the first part of the following discussion, I will focus on
how legislation, current and proposed, is suitable for protecting personal data by
discussing five core issues: cross-border transfer of data, data intrusion, lawful access and jurisdiction, as well as the status of CSPs with respect to the responsibility
for the personal data they process. The discussion will then move on to exploring
the views of industry and privacy commissioners to lead into the final part of this
paper, which is the comparative analysis of the different approaches and where
these may lead to in 2012 and beyond.
When contemplating ways to regulate novel issues or changing technology,
legislators are faced with challenging task: they must regulate without the benefit
of having had years of experience to look back on and they may be pressured to act
quickly. This is case with cloud computing. It has been stated that five rationalities
compete in this respect: the political, legal, cultural, and operative rationalities, and
finally, the internal rationality.53 The nature of these rationalities may be similar
across countries or they may be very different. The manner in which regulators will
ultimately decide to address data in regard to cloud computing might depend most
prominently on the industry itself, public opinion, privacy overseeing bodies and
other privacy experts, the views of law enforcement and, finally, on the political
goals of government. While this paper will not be conducting a step-by-step analysis of all of the factors in the competing rationalities — it could instead be said to
canvass the legal and political rationalities in Canada and the EU while pointing out
gaps that may affect the operational and internal rationalities-, nor will all relevant
players here be surveyed, but it is nonetheless worthwhile to keep this approach in
mind while moving forward in our analysis of the potential for workable, cloudready data protection schemes in Canada and the EU.

(a) Canada
This paper will not delve into the details of privacy in international law but it
is important to note the basic framework and to briefly set out current international
initiatives as they form the basis of and are mutually influential with the Canadian
and EU frameworks. To begin with, there is currently no official international data
protection authority. There is also no overarching authority or association to which
52

53

Brad Smith (General Counsel, Microsoft Corporation), “Building Confidence in the
Cloud: A Proposal for Industry and Government Action for Europe to Reap the Benefits of Cloud Computing”, January 2010, online: European Commission
ec.europa.eu/justice/news/. . ./microsoft_corporation_2nd_document_en.pdf, last accessed on January 15, 2011.
See Peter Wahlgren, “The Legitimacy Sphere: Between Law, Culture, Politics and Enforceability”, in Scandinavian Studies in Law, Vol 56 (Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law & Peter Wahlgren: 2010) at 427. The political rationality means that laws
must operate practically in a democratic society, and the operational rationality that
laws must be enforceable (and possible to follow and uphold) while the legal aspect
suggests that these laws must then also be acceptable from a legal perspective. The
cultural rationality relates to how laws are received within a country’s or region’s culture. Finally, the internal rationality focuses on the laws’ internal logic, i.e. are they
contradictory or do they contains important gaps?
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complaints can be brought, as, for example, in the intellectual property realm.54
However, the data protection schemes in Canada and the EU, as well as other countries, are based on common principles, as first pronounced by the OECD in 1980.55
There are also initiatives, such as the Madrid Resolution56 and the Global Privacy
Enforcement Network,57 which all mark a growing effort on behalf of data protection authorities to reach out to one another and to further international cooperation
and the development of standards. Legislation may be a long way from becoming
harmonized across the (Western) world but this is not stopping international initiatives by data protection authorities to address the issues. The views of these regulatory authorities have been fairly consistent regarding the articulation of the core
privacy and data protection principles are as well as what problems, in their view,
need to be addressed in the Web 2.0 world.58
Canada is a privacy conscious country and as Dr. Cavoukin, current Information and Privacy Officer of Ontario (“IPC”), wrote in 2006, “Self-defense of personal privacy is a growing movement, no longer limited to the actions of a few
privacy hawks.”59 Canada also has a vibrant ICT sector and Canada’s government
and industry have ambitious plans in terms of Canada’s role in the global market.
Canada, much like other parts of the world, is concerned about, and interested in
curbing, crime, including crime using or based on the Internet. These realities can
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Where a patent applicant may register a patent with World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) and claim priority for his invention.
OECD, “OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data”, OECD, online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/document/
18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html>.
International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, “International
Standards on the Protection of Personal Data and Privacy”, November 5th, 2009,
online: Privacy Conference <http://www.privacyconference2009.org/dpas_space/
space_reserved/documentos_adoptados/common/2009_Madrid/estandares_resolucion_
madrid_en.pdf>.
Members are U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada, Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (France), Office of
the Privacy Commissioner, New Zealand, Israeli Law, Information and Technology
Authority, Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Australia, Office of the Data Protection Commissioner, Ireland, Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (Spain), Information Commissioner’s Office (United Kingdom), Garante Per La Protezione Dei Dati
Personali (Italy), Dutch Data Protection Authority (the Netherlands), Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (Germany), Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, (Victoria, Australia).
See e.g. Office of the Canadian Privacy Commissioner, “Joint Letter to Google” (April
19, 2010) OPC, online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2010/let_100420_e.cfm>.
Dr. Ann Cavoukian and Don Tapscott, “Privacy and the Enterprise 2.0” (IT & CA:
October 17, 2006), New Paradigm Learning Corporation, online: New Paradigm
Learning Corporation newparadigm.com/media/Privacy_and_the_Enterprise_2.0.pdf,
last accessed on January 10, 2011.
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at times be at odds60 with one another when it comes to data protection, working at
opposite ends of the spectrum. But can there be symbiotic effects? That is, can the
aims of industry, privacy hawks, privacy overseeing bodies and government be reconciled with the effect of creating a cloud model that provides a mutually recognized adequate data protection framework?

(i) Current Legislation
Canada’s Constitution gives jurisdiction over privacy matters to the federal
and the provincial governments. The public and private sectors are governed by
separate pieces of legislation at a federal and provincial level. Nationally, PIPEDA
governs private sector organizations while the Privacy Act61 governs the public
sphere at a federal level. The Provinces each have separate public sector legislation
but only four (Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario) have specific62
health-sector legislation. Essentially, PIPEDA applies to the processing of personal
information relating to all commercial activities where there is no provincial private-sector legislation, as well as to inter-provincial and international personal data
flows, but it does not regulate activities related to the personal information of employees of provincially regulated organizations. Non-profit organizations in relation
to their non-commercial activities are also not regulated by PIPEDA.63
At a provincial private-sector level, only Alberta, Quebec and British Columbia have enacted their own pieces of commercial private-sector legislation, and
within those Provinces, PIPEDA only applies to federally regulated organizations,
including the personal information of employees of those federal organizations. Alberta and British Columbia legislation specifically regulates the use of personal information of employees.64 The Quebec act does not differentiate between employee
and non-employee personal data.65
This means that a federally regulated company operating in Alberta would be
regulated by both PIPEDA — regarding non-employee personal information- and
the provincial legislation regarding activities related to personal employee information. As a result, Canada does not have an entirely uniform data protection framework. Compared with the EU (where Member States themselves, such as for example Germany, may have a federal-provincial system comparable to that of
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For a discussion surrounding Google’s Street View and Buzz products and their reception by the international privacy community see e.g. Joint Letter to Google, supra, and
Preliminary Letter of Findings, October 19, 2010 — Complaints under PIPEDA
against Google Inc., Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, online: Office of
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nrc/2010/let_100420_e.cfm, last accessed on January 10, 2011>.
R.S., 1985, c. P-21.
In British Columbia, for example, the private-sector act is intended to cover the health
sector.
Whereas, for example, the Alberta PIPA does apply to non-profits but exempts noncommercial use of personal information.
Personal Information Protection Act, SBC, c. 63, 2003, s. 13.
An Act respecting the Protection of personal information in the private sector, RSQ, c
P-39.1.
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Canadian), however, these differences are still quite minor and one can speak of a
relatively cohesive approach throughout the country. It is important to stress that
this statement must be viewed in the context of a comparison with the landscape in
the EU. There are indeed differences within Canada as to how personal information
may be used, collected and disclosed, but the manner in which the private sector is
regulated by PIPEDA and provincial legislation is cohesive in that common principles and a common culture underlie the regulations. PIPEDA applies (subject to the
exceptions noted above) across the entire country while within the EU, the Data
Protection Directive did not have so-called “direct effect”. Rather it forms the
model on which Member States were to base their respective laws, which has led to
27 different variations of that same piece of legislation. This is also one of the main
drivers behind the proposal for a new harmonized European privacy framework
envisioning a “Regulation”66 with direct effect on EU Member States (more on this
proposal under section 3.2.1.).
As we have seen, the Cloud introduces a third actor (at minimum) into the data
protection realm. Rather than just having a collector and a provider of personal
information, in the Cloud there is a third-party actor who is, as Ontario’s Privacy
Commissioner states, “outside of . . . [the] trusted security perimeter”.67 This
model is not to be confused with a regular outsourcing arrangement. These two
may share some common traits — like the need to establish contracts that outline
security measures regarding the processing of personal information- but the CSPcustomer relationship is based on the ad hoc exchange of data and services via the
Internet, while the outsourcing relationship is based on a point-to-point delivery of
services. Privacy legislation must accommodate this new reality and this section
will canvass PIPEDA’s provisions for its “Cloud readiness”, that is, how Canada’s
current legal framework addresses, or is suited to tackle, core cloud-related privacy
issues such as transfer of data into third countries, data intrusion, lawful access and
jurisdiction.

(A) Trans-border Transfer
With some minor exceptions,68 Canadian privacy laws generally do not restrict the transfer of personal data to third countries. In contrast to the EU, at a
federal level Canada has chosen the “organization-to-organization”,69 rather than
the state-to-state approach to regulate the transfer of personal information within
the private sector. While PIPEDA does not restrict the transfer of personal information to other jurisdictions, it does place the obligation on the transferring organiza-
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EC, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and Council on the Protection of inviduals with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement
on such data (General Data Protection Regulation), 2012/0011(COD).
Privacy by Design, supra at 5.
There are some provincial restrictions in certain instances with respect to information
in the hands of public bodies, as well as special rules regarding the storage of financial
information, e.g. s. 239 Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46.
See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Guidelines for Processing Data
Across Borders, online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/guide/2009/gl_dab_090127_e.cfm>.
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tion to ensure a “comparable level” of protection while the information is being
processed by a third party (including those active in another country).70 The OPC
has confirmed this in numerous recent decisions71 and has also released guidelines72 for businesses in this respect, including further clarification on what constitutes a “comparable level of protection”.73 The OPC has confirmed that a “transfer”
is not a “disclosure” but rather a “use” under PIPEDA, which would not require
renewed consent from the data subject.74 The OPC believes that PIPEDA does not
require amendment in terms of the cross-border transfer of data in cloud computing:
We have long stated that we believe that privacy does not hinder innovation
and economic progress. The organization-to-organization approach that underscores PIPEDA supports transborder flows and data protection by holding organizations to account for their personal information protection practices. Information is accessible to authorities regardless of where it resides.
As noted in our Guidelines, we do, however, maintain our view that a careful risk assessment needs to be undertaken prior to any arrangement that
involves the outsourcing of personal data to other organizations that operate
globally, and that this assessment should consider the legal requirements of
the jurisdiction in which the third-party processor operates, as well as some
of the political, economic and social conditions, and any additional risk factors, in that jurisdiction.75

While an organization is not obliged to obtain renewed consent from individuals it is under an obligation to provide notice that information might be transferred
outside of the country. In practice, organizations are making explicit mention of the
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Principle 4.1.3. of Schedule 1.
See PIPEDA Case Summaries 2008 — #313 and #365.
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, “Guidelines for Processing Data
Across Borders”, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, online at
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/guide/2009/gl_dab_090127_e.cfm>, last accessed
on January 12, 2011.
Ibid: “Comparable level of protection” means that the third party processor must provide protection that can be compared to the level of protection the personal information
would receive if it had not been transferred. It does not mean that the protections must
be the same across the board but it does mean that they should be generally
equivalent.”
PIPEDA Case Summary 2008-#394: “With regard to the issue of customer consent, the
Office has taken the position that the sharing of information with a third-party service
provider constitutes a “use” for the purposes of the Act. Organizations obtain customer
consent for the use of personal information for the provision of services or products
when individuals first apply for the service or product. Although service providers may
change over time, if the purpose of the current provider’s use of the personal information has remained the same, organizations are not required to obtain renewed customer
consent for the information use. (emphasis added).”
Report on the 2010 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s Consultations on
Online Tracking, Profiling and Targeting, and Cloud Computing, (May, 2011), online:
IPC <http://www.priv.gc.ca/resource/consultations/report_201105_e.cfm#toc6c>.
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USA Patriot Act76 as the threat of having US authorities access this data (by virtue
of an Order under that Act) is many times the main cause of concern for Canadians
to have their data stored in the United States.77 Indeed, it has been stated that the
USA Patriot Act is a main obstacle toward main-stream adoption of cloud computing not just in Canada, but on a European and also global scale.78 This is despite
the fact that many agree that legislation in other countries very similar to79 and thus
just as threatening to privacy as the Patriot Act. On this very issue, the OPC has
noted that:
The risk of a U.S.-based service provider being ordered to disclose personal
information to U.S. authorities is not a risk unique to U.S. organizations. In
the national security and anti-terrorism context, Canadian organizations are
subject to (and may be just as likely to receive) similar types of orders to
disclose personal information of Canadians to Canadian authorities. There
are also several formal bilateral agreements in place between analogous Canadian and U.S. organizations that provide for the cooperation and exchange
of relevant information. In light of such arrangements, there are many alternatives to a Section 215 Order to obtain information about Canadians (emphasis added).80

Canada’s approach puts the onus to safeguard personal information on the
transferring organization, without imposing any absolute restrictions based on the
transferee’s country of establishment. This approach obviously suits cloud computing because it does not prohibit a transfer into another country per se but focuses on
the organization’s practices itself. But that is not the end of the matter. The Cloud
brings with it an ad hoc outsourcing model. That is, data is transferred into and
downloaded from the Cloud by users ad hoc; data moves freely between customer
and CSP, including potential second and third-tier sub-contractor CSPs, data centres. Also, the location of the data may not always be known to the customer, and
other parties, who are potentially also unknown to the customer, may be processing
customer data. If such is the case, the “openness” and “transparency” principles,
which form the basis of Canadian (and most international) privacy law, cannot
readily be guaranteed, at least not under the current understanding of those principles, notwithstanding the organization-to-organization approach. One must also remember that cloud computing challenges global privacy principles, such as the
OECD Guidelines, which were not intended to accommodate the Internet as we
know it today,81 but a point-to-point transfer of data.
One important distinction that needs to be made when discussing the rules
surrounding transfer of personal data to third-countries is that under PIPEDA, as
noted, consent is required from the data subject, irrespective of whether the data
subject is an employee or another individual whose information is under the control
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115 Stat. 272 (2001).
See PIPEDA Case Summary 2008-#394, supra.
Paul Lanois, “Caught in the Clouds: The Web 2.0, Cloud Computing, and Privacy?”
(Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. L., Vol. 9 No. 2, November 2010) at 45.
Ibid at 46.
PIPEDA Case Summary 2008-#394, supra.
Transborder Flows, supra, at 10.
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of the regulated organization. Under Alberta and BC private sector legislation, the
transfer of “personal employee information” does not require the consent of the
employee, but instead relies on a reasonable and notice standard.82 For a provincially regulated organization with operations in multiple Provinces this means that
the requirements might differ from Province to Province as it might be subject to
PIPA regarding personal employee information in Alberta but PIPEDA regarding
customer personal information that is transferred across Canadian borders, not to
mention the gap in legislation regarding personal employee information in Provinces without private sector privacy legislation (e.g. Saskatchewan).83

(B) Data Intrusion
Data intrusion occurs when there is an unauthorized access to data, usually
stemming from a breach in the security system of an organization. A breach with
respect to personal information occurs where there is an unauthorized disclosure,
loss or access to, or a theft of, personally identifiable information. Strong breach
notification laws are generally considered to play an important role in empowering
individuals’ right to privacy and to informational self-determination84 in increasing
the transparency of an organization’s information handling practices. They also
strengthen best practices of industry and the general public’s awareness of the gravity (and sometimes scale) of breaches that would otherwise not have come to the
forefront.85
Canadian privacy law, with the exception of Alberta’s Personal Information
and Privacy Act,86 does not contain any mandatory breach notification provisions,
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S. 18 PIPA: “An organization may use personal employee information about an individual without the consent of the individual if (a) the information is used solely for the
purposes of (i) establishing, managing or terminating an employment or volunteerwork relationship, or (ii) managing a post-employment or post-volunteer-work relationship, between the organization and the individual, (b) it is reasonable to use the information for the particular purpose for which it is being used, and (c) in the case of an
individual who is a current employee of the organization, the organization has, before
using the information, provided the individual with reasonable notification that personal employee information about the individual is going to be used and of the purposes for which the information is going to be used.”
For further information on this topic, see R. Gary Dickson, Q.C. and Sandra Barreth,
“Privacy Laws and Virtue Testing in the Workplace” (2006), online: Office of the
Information and Privacy Officer of Saskatchewan <http://www.oipc.
sk.ca/Presentations
/WorkplacePrivacyReport.pdf>.
See e.g. OPC Consultation Report at III.II.
Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, “Privacy on the Ground” (2010) 63
Stan. L. Rev. (Draft) at 47, online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1568385>.
S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5, s. 34.1 “An organization having personal information under its
control must, without unreasonable delay, provide notice to the Commissioner of any
incident involving the loss of or unauthorized access to or disclosure of the personal
information where a reasonable person would consider that there exists a real risk of
significant harm to an individual as a result of the loss or unauthorized access or disclosure (emphasis added).”
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yet at least. Bill C-2987 proposes to change this and includes provisions requiring
organizations to report breaches of a “material”88 nature to the Commissioner and,
in cases where the breach poses a “real risk of significant harm to the individual”89
to the affected individuals. The proposed legislation imposes no penalties or other
consequences for non-compliance with this section (in Alberta, the Commissioner
can force an organization to comply)90 and has therefore been criticized in academic as well as in practitioners’ circles.91 Apart from Bill C-29, the Government
has also tabled Bill C-28, the Fighting Internet and Wireless Spam Act.92 Which
has just received royal assent (only parts are in force as of date). Its provisions are
not controversial and are generally accepted as necessary and welcomed93 changes
to PIPEDA.

(C) Lawful Access
According to some, lawful access by governments is one of the most imminent
and grave threats to personal data in the Cloud.94 Digital technologies have enabled
governments to monitor individuals on a large scale like never before in the history
of surveillance technologies.95 The architecture of the Cloud allows this surveillance to be accomplished with less cost and effort, and more surreptitiously.96
Under current legislation, the ability to gain lawful access to telecommunications is governed mainly by the Criminal Code of Canada,97 the Competition Act98
and Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.99 Canada currently does not have
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An Act to Amend the Personal Information Protection and Electronics Documents Act,
3rd Session, 40th Parl., 2010.
Ibid, s. 11, adding s. 10.1 to PIPEDA.
Ibid, s. 10.2.
Ibid, s. 37.1.
Bill McKiernan, “New Federal privacy, anti-spam bill gets mixed reviews” (May 31,
2010) Law Times, online: Law Times <http://www.lawtimesnews.com
/201005316982/Headline-News/New-federal-privacy-anti-spam-bills-get-mixedreviews>.
3rd Session, 40th Parl., 2010.
See Jennifer Kavur, “Kudos for anti-spam bill, concern over PIPEDA changes”, IT
World, online: IT World <http://www.itworldcanada.com/news/kudos-for-anti-spambill-concern-over-pipeda-changes/140774> and Patricia Kosseim, “Federal Privacy
Regulation in 2010: A Balance Sheet”, Remarks at the 6th Annual Administrative Law
and CLE Conference organized by the Osgoode Hall Law School, October 19, 2010,
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <http://www.priv.gc.ca/speech/2010/sp-d_20101019_pk_e.cfm>.
See Caught in the Cloud, supra.
Ibid at 384.
For more on this issue see Caught in the Cloud, supra Part III and Code 2.0, supra
Chapter 5.
R.S. 1985, c. C-46.
R.S. 1985, c. C-34.
R.S., 1985, c. C-23.
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legislation that requires ISPs to deliver subscriber information without a warrant or
court order, maintain minimum data retention periods or that requires ISPs to retain
subscriber information (such as traffic data). As it stands, data retention in Canada
is governed only to the extent of its limitations. Principle 4.5 of PIPEDA states that
“Personal information shall be retained only as long as necessary for the fulfillment
of those purposes.”
All lawful interception is subject to applicable privacy laws, such as PIPEDA
and the Privacy Act, as well as section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,100 which guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure. Under section 7(3) of PIPEDA, information may only be disclosed without
consent in specific circumstances such as information sought to protect national
security, under a warrant and other specified authority, or as required by law.
The Criminal Code sets out particular circumstances wherein telecommunications may be lawfully intercepted. Save for exceptional circumstances,101 an application, ex parte, must be made by the government agent seeking to intercept a communication, either in Court or by way of telephone application (where an in-person
application would not be feasible).102 For some time now, the Canadian Government has been of the view that its laws in this respect are outdated103 and need to
be modernized in order to a) be in line with international commitments, such as the
Convention on Cybercrime,104 and b) to keep up with advancements in technology.105 After initial consultations in 2005 and 2007, legislation aimed at addressing
these, arguable, shortcomings were tabled in 2009.
This legislation was first introduced as Bill C-47, the Technical Assistance for
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Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
s. 184.4 “A peace officer may intercept, by means of any electro-magnetic, acoustic,
mechanical or other device, a private communication where (a) the peace officer believes on reasonable grounds that the urgency of the situation is such that an authorization could not, with reasonable diligence, be obtained under any other provision of this
Part;(b) the peace officer believes on reasonable grounds that such an interception is
immediately necessary to prevent an unlawful act that would cause serious harm to any
person or to property; and(c) either the originator of the private communication or the
person intended by the originator to receive it is the person who would perform the act
that is likely to cause the harm or is the victim, or intended victim, of the harm.”
Ibid at s.183.2.
See e.g. Parliament of Canada, “Lawful Access: the Legislative Situation in Canada”,
Parliament of Canada, online: Parliament of Canada <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/
Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0565-e.html>.
Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention on cybercrime, concerning
the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through com–
puter systems (28 January 2003) online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org
/refworld/docid/47fdfb20f.html>.
See Department of Justice, “Lawful Access — Summary of Submissions to the Lawful
Access Consultation”, Department of Justice, online: Department of Justice
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cons/la-al/sum-res/faq.html, last accessed on January 10,
2011>.
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Law Enforcement in the 21st Century Act,106 was aimed at assisting, along with
Bill C-46,107 law enforcement in gaining access to digital communications. The
key measures of Bill C-47 have been summarized by the “Parliamentary Information and Research Service” as addressing:
a concern expressed by law enforcement agencies, which contend that new
technologies, particularly Internet communications, often present obstacles
to lawful communications interception. The bill permits the following: It
compels telecommunications service providers to have the capability to intercept communications made using their networks, regardless of the transmission technology used (clauses 6 to 15). It provides law enforcement
agencies with access, under an accelerated administrative process without a
warrant or court order, to basic information about telecommunications service subscribers. At the same time, the bill provides for certain protection
measures (clauses 16 to 23).108

After progress of the Bills stalled somewhat after the First Reading in the
House of Commons at the end of 2009, the Government in November of 2010 reintroduced the proposed legislation as Bill C-52,109 along with Bills C-50110 and
C-51.111 These three pieces of legislation have been said to introduce provisions
that would “reshape Internet in Canada” based on mandated surveillance technologies, information disclosure, and new police powers.112 The mandatory disclosure
of information, as well as the type of “basic information” referred to above, is set
forth in s. 16(1) of Bill C-47 (C-52):
Every telecommunications service provider shall provide a person designated under subsection (3), on his or her written request, with any information in the service provider’s possession or control respecting the name, address, telephone number and electronic mail address of any subscriber to
any of the service provider’s telecommunications services and the Internet
protocol address, mobile Identification number, electronic serial number, local service provider identifier, international mobile equipment identity number, international mobile subscriber identity number and subscriber identity
module card number that are associated with the subscriber’s service and
equipment.

The Privacy Commissioner retains explicit authority to audit the practices of
the government officials under this legislation. What is interesting, however, is that
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Canada, 2nd Session, 40th Parl., 2009.
An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Competition Act and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, 2nd Session, 40th Parl., 2009.
“Legislative
Summary”,
LEGISinfo,
online
at
<http://www2.parl.gc.ca/
Sites/LOP/LEGISINFO/index.aspList=ls&Query=5887&Session=22&Language=e>.
An Act regulating telecommunications facilities to support investigations, 3rd Session,
40th Parl., 2010.
An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (interception of private communications and related warrants and orders), 3rd Session, 40th Parl., 2010.
Investigate Powers for the 21st Century Act, 3rd Session, 40th Parl., 2010.
Michael Geist, “Lawful Access Bills Would Reshape Internet in Canada”, Michael
Geist blog, online: Michael Geist <http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view
/5450/159/>.
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an interception pursuant to s. 16(1) is stated to explicitly113 fall under s. 7(3) of
PIPEDA, which allows a disclosure which is “required by law”, rather than s.
7(3)(c.1), which would obligate the requestor of personal information to establish
its lawful authority to access the information under certain prescribed circumstances, such as for reasons of national security. Furthermore, the proposed legislation enables access without court supervision.
This Bill places more of an administrative and commercial burden114 on ISPs
while impeding on individuals’ privacy rights. It also obliges ISPs to use the
“means under its control” to decrypt messages but only if they were encrypted by
that service provider. The Bill does not impose a general obligation to provide
decrypted communications115 but it does mandate an ISP to design its systems so
that they may later be intercepted by law enforcement.116 The threat to personal
information under Bill C-47 is the ISP information mentioned above may be stored
with other, more sensitive, data in a cloud infrastructure. By way of a lawful interception, law enforcement may gain access to data stored in the Cloud much more
easily than would be the case in a traditional client-server infrastructure. Moreover,
a CSP, and thus the cloud customer and data subjects, may not even be aware of
this access.
This piece of legislation may very well be of concern for customers contemplating the use of a CSP in Canada. On the other hand, this legislation does create a
framework under the auspices of the Privacy Commissioner, and the mere existence of a framework (as opposed to uncertainty) may provide increased comfort to
the cloud community.
With the federal election in the Spring of 2011 the proposals (not having received royal assent) died on the Order Paper. However, similar legislation was recently re-introduced by the conservative government as Bill C-30 (short title: Protecting Children from Internet Predators Act),117 which received royal assent on
March 23, 2012. The provisions to a large extent mirror previous proposals and
remain the source of severe criticism by privacy advocates. Bill C-30 is said to give
government a “stunning array of powers”118 to spy on its citizens and the short title
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Bill C-47, s. 23.
ISPs must implement systems in compliance with s. 7 of Bill C-52, including real-time
surveillance capabilities.
s. 6(4): “Despite subsection (3), a telecommunications service provider is not required
to make the form of an intercepted communication the same as it was before the communication was treated if (a) the service provider would be required to develop or acquire decryption techniques or decryption tools; or (b) the treatment is intended only
for the purposes of generating a digital signature or for certifying a communication by
a prescribed certification authority, and has not been used for any other purpose.
Ibid, s. 7.
An Act to Enact the Investigating and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications
Act and to Amend the Criminal Code and Other Act, 1st Session, 41st Parl., 2012.
Michael Geist, “Why Bill C-30 Gives the Govt the Power To Install Its Own Surveillance Equipment on ISP Networks”, Feb 22, 2012, Michael Geist, online:
www.michaelgeist.ca, referring to Section 14 of Bill C-30.
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alone is stirring controversy. It is said to project an atmosphere of fear,119 while
being “disingenuous”,120 and used as a selling tool rather than a reflection of its
aims.121 The Liberal Party has stated that it is principally against warrantless
searches and “will insist on committee hearings that ensure that all concerned
groups are given the opportunity to comment on the proposed legislation. [. . .] judicial oversight (issuing of warrants) should be required in virtually all circumstances before a permit is issued for the gathering or sharing of an individual or
organization’s information.”122 Privacy advocacy groups have noted that “8 in 10”
Canadians oppose the introduction of these laws.123

(D) Jurisdiction
In the Cloud data is uploaded, downloaded, stored and otherwise processed
using the Internet as the main transportation and access medium. Data is often sent
across jurisdictional boundaries and used in multiple locations, calling into question
matters such as applicable law (where contract silent) and proper jurisdiction for
launching of complaints.
Recent decisions in Canada have brought some clarity to these issues. In
Lawson v. Accusearch Inc.124 the matter before the Federal Court was whether or
not the Commissioner had jurisdiction to investigate a complaint against a US company that was allegedly processing information of Canadians in contravention of
PIPEDA. The Court held that the Commissioner indeed had jurisdiction over the
complaint on account of the “substantial connection” to Canada (individuals were
resident in Canada) and the nature of the subject matter. This means that an organization located outside of Canada, but collecting (or otherwise processing) data from
Canadians (in the course of commercial activities) may be subject to the jurisdiction of the OPC.125
The OPC is of the view that complaints brought by individuals against a CSP
will fall under her jurisdiction when “the assessment indicates that real and substantial connection to Canada exists”.126 To what extent this holds true will likely
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Matt Hartley, “Comment: Canada’s embarrassing failure on lawful access legislation”,
Feb 14, 2012, National Post, online: <http://business.financialpost.com/
2012/02/14/comment-canadas-embarrassing-failure-on-lawful-access-legislation/>.
Dr. Ann Cavoukian, as quoted in “Toews surprised by content of online surveillance
bill” CBC, online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/02/18/pol-thehousevic-toews.html>.
See e.g. “Protecting Children from Internet Predators Act”, Wikipedia, online:
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protecting_Children_from_Internet_Predators_Act>.
Marc Garneau, Letter to Canadians, (October 31, 2011), Open Media, online at:
<https://openmedia.ca/sites/openmedia.ca/files/SOS_LPCStatement_111104.pdf>.
Open Media, online: <http://openmedia.ca/news/liberals-join-8-out-10-canadiansstanding-against-government%E2%80%99s-warrantless-online-spying-bills>.
2007 FC 125.
Note that in Canada, where contracts are entered into over the Internet, jurisdiction
exists where Canada is either the Country of transmission or reception SOCAN v.
Canadian Ass’n of Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 at 457.
Reaching for the Cloud(s), supra.
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be explored in future decisions of the OPC and the Courts, but given the case law it
is hard to imagine that a Canadian resident who has her data processed by a nonresident CSP will not be able to bring a complaint based on the CSPs alleged
breach of PIPEDA. This rather clear legal framework should add to the comfort
level of Canadians with respect to the use of cloud computing.

(E) Status of CSPs
Because cloud computing introduces a new actor into the data provider-data
collector dynamic, even as compared with a traditional outsourcing relationship,
the question of responsibility and accountability naturally arises. In Canada, there is
less uncertainty about this issue than in the EU. The OPC has stated that it might
investigate a complaint involving cloud computing in four situations, the nature of
which will determine which actor will be responsible for complying with PIPEDA.
The first complaint might arise where personal data is provided by a cloud customer to a CSP. Here, the OPC is clear that it considers this a “transfer for the
purpose of processing” under Principle 4.1.3127 and that the customer of the CSP
will be held accountable for the handling of the personal data. However, the OPC
also takes the position that where the CSP acts “outside the processing relationship”, for example misuse or unauthorized access to data, that it will itself be responsible vis-a-vis the regulating authorities.128 Appropriate cases have not come
up as of yet but this assessment is a likely outcome. The third situation involving
CSPs and personal information would be where a private person uses a cloud service such as a webmail or photo storage application, and those providers are in
breach of their PIPEDA obligations. The final situation where a CSP may be responsible in the first instance arises for a private cloud structure in one organization. Again, the CSP would find itself in the position of the (initial) “data controller”, to use the EU terminology. As will see in 3.2.1.5., the categorization in EU
legislation is much less straightforward on this point.

(ii) Government Cloud Strategies
The Canadian Government was scheduled to launch its digital strategy, Canada’s Digital Economy Strategy, in the spring of 2011. The five cornerstones of
this strategy are set to include infrastructure, business adoption of digital technologies, Canadian business supplying digital products to the world, a skilled workforce
and Canadian content on digital platforms.129 To date, this strategy has still not
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Schedule 1 of PIPEDA, being ““An organization is responsible for personal information in its possession or custody, including information that has been transferred to a
third party for processing. The organization shall use contractual or other means to
provide a comparable level of protection while the information is being processed by a
third party.”
128 Reaching for the Cloud(s), supra.
129 “Minister Clement Updates Canadians on Canada’s Digital Economy Strategy”, Industry Canada News Release, online at www.ic.gc.ca/eic/ic1.nsf/eng/06096.html, last accessed on January 10, 2011.
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been released by the government, which has been criticized heavily.130 Without a
concrete legal and technological strategy, Canada risks losing valuable ground both
from an economic and consumer protection standpoint.
That, albeit important, point aside, part of the strategy is supposed to include
new or updated legislation covering copyright (Bill C-32) (2nd Reading, but stalled
since end of 2010), anti-spam (Bill C-28) (received royal assent, but only the sections amending complaints in PIPEDA have come into force) and privacy (Bill C29) (First Reading, stalled since end of 2010), but the government has made hardly
any progress on this front since the last election. With respect to privacy the strategy explains Bill C-29 as “protecting” and “empowering” consumers while “clarifying” and “streamlining” rules for businesses and “enabling” effective law enforcement. Cloud technologies are mentioned as specifically valuable for the
government and the SME (small and medium-sized business) sectors.
The Canadian government has itself been slower131 in moving services or internal processes into the Cloud than, for example, parts of the US administration.132 Canada’s CTO of Public Works presented a strategy133 for the government’s approach to cloud computing leadership in the Autumn of 2009. In his view,
Canada has the potential for becoming a leader in the field:
Due to its geographical characteristics, cooler temperatures and low-density
population(particularly as one moves farther north in Canada), IT expertise,
quality construction standards, legislative framework (including the Privacy
Act and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
Act) and low-cost green energy, Canada is considered a prime location for
Cloud Computing. Canada has a reputation of being a highly desirable outsourcing location for companies from around the world because of factors
such as our well-educated talent pool, multicultural population, geopolitical
stability and relatively low cost of conducting business.

Since then, however, the process of ensuring Canada’s leadership or at least
competitiveness has stalled somewhat from the Government’s side, whereas in
other parts of the world, including the EU and the United States, the move towards
government clouds and overall cloud strategies has intensified. This has led some
commentators to worry that the lack of the government’s lead, along with fears of
storing data with American CSPs, will lead to Canada being left behind in the race
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Michael Geist Keynote speech, Canada’s Digital Strategy, “Hidden in Plain Sight”,
Michael Geist, online: <http://www.michaelgeist.ca/>.
131 See e.g. Rafael Ruffalo, “Canadian government catches up in Cloud at GTEC” (October 6, 2010) IT World Canada, online: IT World Canada
<http://www.itworldcanada.com/news/canadian-government-catches-up-on-cloud-atgtec/141672>.
132 See e.g. Darryl Taft, “Amazon Helps U.S. Government Move to the Cloud”, May 14,
2010, eWeek, online: eWeek <http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Cloud-Computing/AmazonHelps-US-Government-Move-to-the-Cloud-883856/>.
133 Jiri Danek (CTO of Canadian Public Works), “Cloud Computing and the Canadian
Environment”, Sribd, online: Scibd <http://www.scribd.com/doc/20818613/CloudComputing-and-the-Canadian-Environment#open_download>.
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for becoming a leader in this field.134 2011 was supposed to provide more clarity in
terms of the Canadian Government’s proposals but as of present, the sense is that
Canada, as compared to the EU and its Member States, lags behind in its articulation and implementation of a cloud vision, a view that is shared within industry.

(iii) Views of Privacy Commissioners
Legal uncertainties make it difficult to assess the status of information in the
cloud as well as the privacy and confidentiality protections available to
users. The law badly trails technology and the application of old law to new
technology can be unpredictable. For example, current laws that protect
electronic communications may or may not apply to cloud computing communications or they may apply differently to different aspects of cloud
computing.135

The above was written for an American audience but remains equally applicable here. The fact that laws need to be amended in order to accommodate Web 2.0
applications and business models seems to be universally accepted. Privacy laws
may have been drafted vaguely so as to accommodate unforeseen future technologies but ultimately, they do not always match the requirements of cloud computing.
The extent to which this adjustment needs to occur is not always uncontested. The
OPC concluded a consultation process with the public and industry experts on current issues within privacy and data protection, including issues surrounding Cloud
computing136 in May of 2011. In the report, the OPC applauds that Bill C-29 includes breach notification measures. These measures have been considered inadequate by some notable academics137 as lacking teeth. Industry, on the other hand,
has approached breach notification cautiously, especially in terms of penalties for
non-compliance,138 and is generally of the view, as will be discussed in more detail
below, that mandatory breach notification should not be part of a legislative scheme
in Canada, or at least, that industry is allowed much discretion regarding when and
whom to notify.
The Canadian OPC is currently amongst the leaders in the international data
protection arena. A prominent recent example of this trailblazing was the Facebook
case. It was in response to this inquiry that Facebook agreed to make changes to its
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Jack Newton, “Clouded Thinking; Will regulator fear turn Canada into a cloud computing ghetto?”, Slaw Blog, online: Slaw Blog www. slaw.ca.
Robert Gellman, “Privacy in the Clouds: Risks to Privacy and Confidentiality from
Cloud Computing,” World Privacy Forum (February 23, 2009), online: World Privacy
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See 2011 Report, supra.
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privacy policies and standards, which are, of course, in effect globally.139 Among
the changes brought about by the Commissioner related to sharing information with
3rd party applications only on express consent, clarifying rules on the deactivation
of accounts and also the tracking of non-users who were invited to join Facebook,
but declined to do so.
But the federal commissioner is not the only active player in Canada. Provincial Commissioners, like Frank Work in Alberta and, in particular Dr. Ann
Cavoukian, the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner of (“IPC”), are also
among those providing helpful insights and positions on privacy and its role in the
Web 2.0 world. Dr. Cavoukian recently released a document which proposes a privacy-by-design model140 as the central protection measure for privacy in the
Cloud. In this model, the Commissioner promotes a six-principle approach, at the
core of which lies encryption technology. In order to allow cloud technologies to
develop while providing adequate protection for individuals’ personal information
it would be necessary to address the data protection concerns while allowing for
adequate access to the data (or else the cloud model would not work). To ensure
this, it is proposed that an audit architecture, along with a cloud identity service
provider would be introduced into the individual-customer-CSP relationship.
The IPC has also published a white paper141 on the Internet’s implications on
privacy, in which she promotes the use of privacy enhancing technologies (PETSs),
which include elements called private “tokens”,142 bits of encrypted data to establish the identity of the individual vis a vis the ISP without actually revealing the
identity of the individual. Criminal investigations would still be possible with these
tokens because the token is capable of being traced back to the individual.The privacy-by-design model proposed by the IPC essentially advocates the architecture of
all systems that process personal data to be designed so that they include privacy
considerations at the outset, and not as an afterthought. This model has now gained
international recognition and was adopted by the 32nd International Conference of
Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners as a Resolution.143
With respect to lawful access, in particular the proposed legislation discussed
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Press Release, “Facebook agrees to address Privacy Commissioner’s concerns”, Office
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above, the OPC has voiced grave concerns144 (at the time in regard to Bills C-46
and 47):
In summary, we urge Parliament to review Bills C-46 and C-47 in light of
the following questions: In specific terms, how is the current regime of judicial authorization not meeting the needs of law enforcement and national
security authorities in relation to the Internet? What law enforcement or
national security duty justifies access without a warrant by authorities to
personal information or preservation of private communication? Why are
some of these powers unrestricted, when the spirit of Canadian law clearly
reflects the view that access or seizure without court authorization should be
exceptional? And finally, are the mechanisms for accountability commensurate to the unprecedented powers envisaged (emphasis added)?

These concerns have been echoed and perhaps even escalated with respect to
bills C-50, 51 and 52, and now C-30. The Ontario Commissioner has created an
entire website devoted to raising awareness surrounding privacy invasive features
of this tabled legislation.145 2012 will shed more light on whether the concerns of
the OPC and IPC will bring about additional changes to the lawful interception
proposals but the concerns stated above have been voiced since the beginning of
the consultation period and have consistently related to the proposed legislation
overstepping the privacy rights guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.146

(b) Europe
(i) Legislation
The European Union currently comprises 27 nations. Each one of these has its
own distinct tradition with respect to the nature of how the term “privacy” (or the
equivalent value in that tradition) is to be understood, as well as protected and regulated.147 The basic data protection framework consists of the Data Protection Directive, the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications (e-privacy Directive),148 the Data Retention Directive,149 and the 2009 e-privacy Directive.150
The Data Protection Directive and the e-privacy Directive provide the general
framework for data protection in Europe. One of the cornerstones of this framework is that personal data may not be transferred to a country that does not have
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“adequate protection”151 (as determined by the EU Commission). Data flows may
not, on the other hand, be restricted within the EU on the grounds that data protection is inadequate.152
A note on the recently released proposal to amend the EU data protection
framework: this paper was researched and written prior to the publishing of the EU
proposal for a new privacy framework. The proposal’s aim is to harmonize the EU
landscape by implementing a directly effective Regulation (rather than guiding Directive), which is surely a step in the right direction for cloud proliferation. There
are also steps to simplify the administrative process: for example, dealing with one
DPA rather than one in every Member State to approve data transfers. However,
this first proposal may do very little to assist cloud adoption outside of the EU. As
the most evident example of this are the continued restrictions on data transfers as
well as the requirement to obtain explicit opt-in consent for all processing of personal data, as well as strict data breach notification provisions, coupled with privacy-by-design obligations.153 The fact that the most severe breaches can cost organizations up to two percent of annual turnover only increases the risk associated
with the Cloud.154 The expected date of a finalized piece of legislation is 2014.

(A) Trans-border Transfer
The European approach to data transfers is anchored in Article 25 of the Data
Protection Directive, which prohibits the transfer of data into third countries without “adequate protection” for the data. Transfers are only permitted under: a) specific circumstances listed in Article 26(1), b) where the transferee organization has
signed on to the Safe Harbor155 agreement, or c) where the organization uses
“binding corporate rules”156 (when transferring between groups of companies or
international organizations) or “EU Model Contract Clauses”.157 The Article 29
Working Party158 has developed a number of policy documents for the use of organizations wishing to use “binding corporate rules” (“BCRs”) as a workaround to
Article 25.159
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

158

159

Article 25.
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The most notable of these inadequate countries is the US. The reasons for this
are rooted in the provisions of the USA Patriot Act, which gives broad surveillance
powers to law enforcement. Whether or not the Safe Harbor agreement would
trump US law such as the USA Patriot Act, is as of date legally uncertain. It follows
then, that data transferred to the US might not necessarily be “safer” through Safe
Harbor, at least not until this question has been raised and decided by American
courts. This issue aside, many important CSPs are American, with data centres in
the US and elsewhere. Some CSPs may have signed on to Safe Harbor but certainly
not all providers will have done so. In these cases, European legislation is a bar to
European customers using cloud services, where information in not only outsourced but often also to locations unknown to the customer (and the data subject).
Germany’s Commissioner makes the following relevant points here:
With regard to data processing outside the EU, an adequate level of data
protection must be ensured in any location to which data can be transferred
in connection with CC. Since the Cloud is not, however, geographically limited per definition, it is hard to imagine whether and how it is possible at all
to put the requirements relating to data protection law into practice (emphasis added).160

It is hard to imagine in this situation that a data subject is able to give his or
her “consent” (as this is understood in Article 26(1)) to the transfer to a country
without adequate protection. From a compliance perspective, lawful access by US
officials via the USA Patriot Act may be a concern for potential cloud customers as
well as regulators, but from a pure legal perspective this is less pressing than the
concern that storing data outside of the EU runs afoul Article 25. Uploading data
into the Cloud is considered “processing” under EU law161 and so therefore the
Data Protection Directive will apply to CSPs processing personal information of
EU data subjects, whether or not the CSPs are based in the EU or not. On this point
one must note, however, that according to the Bodil Lindkvist162 case, uploading
information onto a webpage is not to be considered a “transfer” of personal data
within the meaning of Article 25 of the Directive. That is, the act of uploading a
photo on Flickr without further processing would not come within the purview of
the legislation.
The exceptions to the transfer prohibition, such as model contract clauses, although considered a good initiative, are by no means a complete answer to data
transfer among customers and CSPs, as all parties must be under the same obliga-

WP 108: Working Document Establishing a Model Checklist Application for Approval
of Binding Corporate Rules (pdf); WP 133: Recommendation 1/2007 on the Standard
Application for Approval of Binding Corporate Rules for the Transfer of Personal
Data; WP 153: Working Document setting a table with the elements and principles to
be found in Binding Corporate Rules (pdf); WP 154: Working Document Setting up a
framework for the structure of Binding Corporate Rules (pdf); WP 155: Working Document on Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) related to Binding Corporate Rules
(pdf).
160 Peter Schaar’s comments, supra.
161 Lanois, supra at 46.
162 (2004/C7/04).
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tions (not just “similar” as under Canadian law). Implementing these will be a challenge in a cloud environment.163 To address these challenges, CSPs have been offering “European Cloud” services that isolate European data from other data164 but
these measures will not be enough if the long-term goal is to have Europeans benefitting from the model to the full extent. That is, at some point, there must be clarity
on the regulations affecting CSPs and cloud customers (if the goal is, of course, to
advance cloud adoption). Sweden’s DPA has recently released a document on the
obligations of companies wanting to use CSPs but added little in way of practical
guidance that would allow worry-free use of non-EU, in particular US, CSPs.165

(B) Data Intrusion
European law mandates Member States to include breach notification provisions for “providers of electronic communications services” in their national laws
by May, 2011 by virtue of the 2009 e-privacy Directive. Article 4 in the e-Privacy
Directive obliges Telecommunications companies to notify subscribers in case of
the risk of a security breach regarding electronically stored personal data and the
2009 Directive expanded the framework to include breach notification provisions
for all personal data:166
In the case of a personal data breach,167 the provider of publicly available
electronic communications services shall, without undue delay, notify the
personal data breach to the competent national authority. When the personal
data breach is likely to adversely affect the personal data or privacy of a
subscriber or individual, the provider shall also notify the subscriber or individual of the breach without undue delay. Notification of a personal data
breach to a subscriber or individual concerned shall not be required if the
provider has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the competent authority that
it has implemented appropriate technological protection measures, and that
those measures were applied to the data concerned by the security breach.
Such technological protection measures shall render the data unintelligible
to any person who is not authorised to access it. Without prejudice to the
provider’s obligation to notify subscribers and individuals concerned, if the
provider has not already notified the subscriber or individual of the personal
data breach, the competent national authority, having considered the likely
adverse effects of the breach, may require it to do so.
The notification to the subscriber or individual shall at least describe the
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nature of the personal data breach and the contact points where more information can be obtained, and shall recommend measures to mitigate the possible adverse effects of the personal data breach. The notification to the
competent national authority shall, in addition, describe the consequences
of, and the measures proposed or taken by the provider to address, the personal data breach (emphasis added).

Note that the threshold to notify is “adversely affect”, which is rather broad
and thus allows for less discretion on the part of the organization on whether or not
to notify. This will naturally increase the control of the individual over their data
because they will know not only of major breaches but of any that have an adverse
affect. Should a company fall short of this notification requirement the competent
authority “shall impose appropriate sanctions in the event of a failure to do so.”168
Germany’s Datenschutzgesetz169 stipulates a mandatory breach notification
procedure that requires breach notification where the breach was with respect to
four categories of sensitive data.170 The competent authority must be notified immediately in cases of “threats of serious harm or to the rights of legitimate interests
of data subjects”. Individuals must be informed of the breach, but only after “appropriate measures to safeguard the data have been taken and notification would no
longer endanger criminal prosecution.” The requirement is, unlike to the European
framework, not limited to telecommunications providers and will apply to all data
controllers.
Although not as fragmented as the data retention scheme, EU notification procedures differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Since CSPs will many times be storing data from citizens from different member states, they will need to be aware of
all local laws in order to be compliant, rather than being able to focus on one set of
rules. The advantage of this scheme is that users of a cloud service in Europe can
rest assured that breaches will be brought to their or to the authorities’ attention,
which may increase the comfort level of customers opting to choose cloud services.
That is, there is no uncertainty from a citizen’s perspective with respect to how they
will be notified, at least by law, in case of a data breach. Industry, however, may
have a considerable level of discomfort, knowing that they may be onside one but
another set of laws, all within Europe and for the same service. Compared with the
United States, this is not a significant disadvantage, as many states have their own,
and quite divergent, set of privacy laws. Compared with jurisdictions that have a
more uniform set of laws, including Canada, however, this will be a likely drawback for industry, where foreseeability and consistency is highly desirable.

(C) Lawful Access
Lawful access in the EU is governed by the Council Resolution on Lawful
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Interception of Telecommunications.171 The powers granted to law enforcement are
not significantly different from the Canadian framework and will therefore not be
illustrated in more detail. What is highly relevant, however, is that European countries have taken a variety of different approaches on legal interception. One cannot
speak of a harmonized framework at all.172 Countries such as Sweden, Germany173
and the United Kingdom174 have passed legislation requiring Telecommunications
companies, including ISPs, to enable lawful interception of telecommunications by
law enforcement, but the requirements imposed on ISPs are not uniform from country to country.175 For example, the legislation in Germany and the U.K. applies to
IPSs with more than 10,000 subscribers, but unlike in the U.K., German IPSs are
not entitled to compensation for costs incurred while complying with the legislation.176 In Sweden, a highly controversial177 “wire-tapping” law entered into force
in October of 2009,178 which some say goes much beyond the EU Directive in
terms of access to data.
The Data Retention Directive places an additional burden on ISPs by requiring
Member States to pass legislation to have IPSs retain traffic data,179 such as email
address and IP address, for a period of 6–24 months.180 In fact, Member States may
require periods exceeding 24 months. But again, not all Member States have translated the Directive into national law. European countries have taken different approaches in this regard. Sweden, for example, had initially refused to do so entirely181 and has yet to implement the Directive (a proposal was tabled in
November 2010 for a law to be in force by the middle of 2011). The proposal sets
forth the minimum 6-month retention period on the one hand but proposes to include more data than the Directive demands.182 Contrast this with Germany where
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Überwachung der Telekommunikation, (BGBI. I. S. 458), January 22, 2002.
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c. 23).
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Larsson, supra at 435.
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försvarsunderrättelseverksamhet.
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Article 6.
See Mikael Ricknäs “Sweden Challenges EU Data Retention Directive”, Computer World, online: Computer World <http://www.computerworld.com/s/article
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the German Federal Court held that national transposition of the Directive was inconsistent with the Grundgesetz (German Basic Law/Constitution).183 This illustrates two of the biggest issues for European law in this respect: consistency and
foreseeability.
With respect to the cloud computing model, lawful interception and data retention are obvious causes for concern in Europe. The lack of harmonization has a
direct negative effect on CSPs (and customers), who may be unsure of their obligations, not to mention being subject to additional costs. On this point, privacy watchdogs and industry make for strange bedfellows. Industry players and data protection authorities may be at odds on a number of issues,184 but here it is in both their
interests to see data retention and legal interception harmonized or abolished.

(D) Jurisdiction
The Data Protection Directive will apply to all organizations established, or
using equipment situated in the EU (or where Directive would apply on account of
international law), who process personal data.185 “Equipment” would include data
and hosting servers, but could also include a personal computer or cookies where
those are used to process personal data. This means, for example, that a non-EU
resident private person who processes personal data while in the EU would be subject to the Directive.
European authorities have also taken the position that foreign organizations
with entities within the European Union, must adapt their data protection policies to
comply with EU Law.186 In the SWIFT187 decision it was ultimately held that
SWIFT’s US operations were not obliged to adhere to European law but this was
only after SWIFT in the US joined Safe Harbor, and it does show that European
authorities will assert jurisdiction over foreign entities. European authorities may
also assert jurisdiction where information is transferred onward by a foreign entity.
The European Commission has stated that an “onward transfer” must comply with
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“Letter to Eric Schmidt” (April 19, 2010), Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Ca–
ada, online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <http
://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2010/let_100420_e.cfm>.
Data Protection Directive, Article 4.
See discussion of the SWIFT case in “Data Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet”, Int J Law Info Tech (2010) 18 (3): 227–247. doi: 10.1093/ijlit/eaq004. First published online March 11, 2010.
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unofficial English translation online: Privacy Commission <<http://www.privacy
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the principles of EU law.188 Where personal data is transferred to a CSP with servers in multiple jurisdictions it is relatively clear that EU law will apply alongside
the local law of the location of the servers. Where, for example, an American CSP
receives personal data of European data subjects and wishes to transfer this data for
further processing within the US, it must be aware of European laws and adhere to
them. This may be cumbersome for CSPs but provides a certain degree of comfort
to individuals who can rest assured that their personal data will receive a similar
level of protection even after transferred into the geographical uncertainties of the
Cloud.

(E) Status of CSPs
EU law differentiates between data “controllers”, “processors” and “third parties”.189 Processors process data “on behalf” of the controller but their data protection responsibilities differ from those of the controller. Article 16 of the Data Protection Directive obliges the processor, or a person acting on her behalf, to only
process data “on instruction” from the controller (unless required to do so by law).
Article 17190 outlines the duties of the controller vis a vis the processor and a review of these illustrates the importance of the distinction between the two terms.
The controller, not the processor, carries the ultimate responsibility for the personal
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See Data Protection Law, supra.
These terms are defined in the Data Protection Directive as follows: “controller” shall
mean the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which
alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of
personal data; where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national
or Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be designated by national or Community law; “processor” shall mean a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller;’third party’ shall mean any natural or legal
person, public authority, agency or any other body other than the data subject, the controller, the processor and the persons who, under the direct authority of the controller or
the processor, are authorized to process the data.
190 1. Member States shall provide that the controller must implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful
destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular where the processing involves the transmission of data over a network, and against
all other unlawful forms of processing. Having regard to the state of the art and the cost
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the technical security measures and organizational measures governing the processing
to be carried out, and must ensure compliance with those measures. 3. The carrying out
of processing by way of a processor must be governed by a contract or legal act binding the processor to the controller and stipulating in particular that the processor shall
act only on instructions from the controller,- the obligations set out in paragraph 1, as
defined by the law of the Member State in which the processor is established, shall also
be incumbent on the processor.
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data. In an Opinion in early 2010 the Article 29 Working Party clarified191 the
concepts of the respective duties of controller and processor, and then at the end of
that year, it included CSPs in this clarification, at least to a certain extent. The user
of the cloud service would be the data controller in most circumstances, but CSP
may also be considered a data controller:
If the cloud service provider uses means in the EU, it will be subject to EU
data protection law on the basis of Article 4(1)c. As demonstrated below,
the application of the Directive would not be triggered by means used for
transit purposes only, but it would be triggered by more specific equipment
e.g. if the service uses calculating facilities, runs java scripts or installs
cookies with the purpose of storing and retrieving personal data of users.
The cloud service provider will then have to provide users with information
on the way data are being processed, stored, possibly accessed by third parties, and to guarantee appropriate security measures to protect the
information.192

PIPEDA does not distinguish between a controller and processor in the same
way as the Data Protection Directive, and so the ultimate outcome of this determination could (but need not) be that the same CSP is considered a “controller” under
the EU law and but fall outside of the obligations of PIPEDA in Canada. A CSP
may also be considered a “controller” by virtue of having “joint” control under
Article 2(d) of the Directive. However, the joint control concept does not exist in
all Member States, most notably Germany. This issue lack of certainty is a major
concern for industry and potential customers and will need to be addressed in the
upcoming years.

(ii) Government Cloud Strategies
The recently unveiled ICT strategy of Germany193 along with the related
“Cloud Computing: Aktionsprogramm”194 indicates that Germany intends to be
among the leaders within the G-8 and G-20 in this regard. The program and the
overall strategy are explicit in its statement that the German Government wishes to
“accelerate” the adoption of cloud computing in Germany, in particular the small
and medium-sized business sector. In order to achieve this primary goal, four measures195 are pinpointed; among them the establishment of workable legal solutions
to cope with the novel issues the Cloud raises. BITKOM, Germany’s IT industry
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adopted on January 16, 2010.
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November 2010.
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association, has welcomed this strategy, stating that “swift” action on behalf of industry and government is needed to ensure Germany’s competitiveness in the
Cloud arena.196
At a European level, strategies for Cloud computing were also unveiled and
developed during 2010. The Expert Report197 includes an analysis of Europe’s
positioning to take a leading role in cloud development. While identifying a number of strengths and weaknesses, no direct mention was made regarding either the
strength or weakness of European privacy laws. While there is no official European
cloud strategy, the EU Digital Agenda Commissioner, Neelie Kroes, promised this
will be forthcoming in 2011.198 At this point, it looks like this strategy will be
unveiled in early 2012. The consultation to the European Commission closed on
August 31, 2011:
I am excited about the potential benefits of cloud computing to cut costs,
improve services and open up new business opportunities. We need a welldefined cloud computing strategy to ensure that we make the best use of this
potential. The input we are requesting from all interested parties is important to get it right.199

In terms of governments themselves moving services into the Cloud, Europe
has not made significant strides. However, ENISA (European Network and Information Security Society) has just released a report200 to advise and guide governmental agencies in their adoption of cloud computing and there are signs that socalled “G-Clouds” are a thing of the not-so-distant future.

(iii) Views of Data Protection Authorities
In an open letter posted on the German Commissioner’s website, commenting
on European laws to adequately deal with personal data in the Cloud, Peter Schaar
questions the ability of the Cloud to comply with German and EU data protection
laws:
As an example (of the problematic of European legislation and the cloud) I
would like to refer to the provisions in Sect. 11 BDSG on commissioned
data processing. The order in writing must contain detailed provisions on
the processing and protection of the data, and prior to data processing and
regularly in the course of data processing, the principal has to make sure
that the provisions are complied with. This requires that the principal knows
in detail which of the data are processed at which location and under which
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conditions. But how is this to be managed if free server capacities are selected only on an ad hoc basis (emphasis added)?201

Also in Germany, the Konferenz der Datenschutzbeauftragten des Bundes und
der Länder202 recently pointed out that the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz is currently
unfit to properly regulate personal data processing which is both border-crossing
and divided in terms of responsibility, as can be the case in cloud computing. The
members of the Conference make a number of suggestions to amend the
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (and corresponding Länder laws). Firstly, the concept of
the “verantwortliche Stelle” (responsible party) is to be brought firmly in line with
the definition of “controller”203 in the Directive. Secondly, where there is more
than one responsible party, regulations should be dependent on the ability to influence the processing204 as well as the interests in the data of each processing party
(“interessengerechte Verteilung der Verantwortlichkeit”). These suggestions are intended to achieve responsibility and accountability of each party to the data
processing, where, inter alia, cloud computing is used, and will enable continued
responsibility of the transferring party (where the ability to influence the data transferee exists). Additionally, it was argued that where there is simultaneous processing by multiple parties, obligations should rest with all parties involved in the
processing (i.e. joint controllership).
Recently, however, the German DPA provided more specific guidance regarding cloud computing.205 The recommendations provided therein may not have been
exactly what industry was hoping for but at least they provide some much needed
guidance on what not to do when engaging the services of a CSP. For example, the
DPA has stated that sensitive data may not be transferred to a US cloud service
(other than with the express consent of the individual), and that any party using a
cloud provider in the US, even within Safe Harbor, must verify that the US provider will agree to abide by EU compliance regulations.
The Swedish Data Inspection Board had preliminary concerns206 related to the
risk with transferring information across the Internet, data intrusion, encryption,
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how the controller can ensure that the processor, i.e. the CSP, actually implements
the privacy measures the controller is ultimately responsible for but has recently
released its views on the obligations of Cloud users. While this document does not
do much in the way of simplifying CSP-use, it does provide some clarity that the
Swedish DPA will put the onus on the controller who will always be the CSP user
and it is he who must ensure that the Swedish Act is complied with, including
ensuring all processor and sub-processor agreements are in-line with his processing
instructions (in turn compliant with the legislation).207
At the EU level, Peter Hustinx recently commented208 stated that there are
four main areas of concern, which need to be addressed in the framework: a) Applicable law, including a new criterion such as “targeting”, b) International data transfers, including streamlining the use of binding corporate rules and extending the
responsibility of controllers, c) Accountability and “privacy by design” would give
strong incentives to ensure that cloud computing services are privacy friendly, and
if necessary even with some “privacy by default”, and d) “processor” obligations
where services are provided to individuals acting in a purely personal capacity.

(c) Industry Views and Proposals
People have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more information
and different kinds, but more openly and with more people [. . .] That social
norm is just something that has evolved over time.209

Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s comments caused quite a stir210 within the
privacy community at the beginning of 2010. Whether the commotion was warranted or if Mr. Zuckerberg’s comments actually reflect popular society’s development aside, they provide an example of an industry viewpoint on perceived privacy
expectations in the Web 2.0 era: privacy will be diminished online but people
might not care or at a minimum, values regarding what is considered as being “private” have changed.
Many well-known businesses are now cloud service providers. These include
Amazon, Google, Sales Force, IBM and Microsoft, as well as of course Facebook,
which are all placing much hope in the future of cloud technologies and the popular
adoption thereof. In recent submission to the European Union, Microsoft explained
its vision for industry and government action with respect to data protection in Europe.211 This vision includes the right balance between government, consumer and
industry action to enable “cloud ready” infrastructure, coherent legal framework in
Europe, transparency about privacy and security by cloud providers, and security of
the systems. Contrary to the thoughts of data protection authorities discussed
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herein, industry does not share the same concerns that the cloud model is not able
to comply with the current legal framework. Adjustments to the technical and legal
frameworks may be called for but it would not be “impossible” to comply with a
harmonized system and so that should be the primary legislative objective.212
In a “Joint Industry Statement on Data Protection” by the four major European
Trade Associations of the Telecommunications Industry, it was pointed out that the
European framework suffers from a lack of harmonization, unclear rules regarding
the status of CSPs as processors and controllers, and a major barrier in the form of
its restrictive trans-border data transfer policies.213
Microsoft also provided a response214 to Canada’s Digital Strategy consultation in which it both praised and criticized Canada’s policies with respect to ICT.
Among the criticism was that Canada was not “an early adopter” of ICT technologies and did not invest enough in digital technologies. With respect to privacy issues, Microsoft noted that Canada has a “robust” privacy regime but that PIPEDA
needed to be overhauled. Bill C-29 was said to be a step in the right direction but
may not be entirely sufficient. The paper went on to suggest that Canada needed a
more comprehensive scheme for the transfer of data across borders but did not provide reasons for this view. This criticism is slightly unwarranted since the current
Canadian scheme already addresses the transfer of personal data abroad and is quite
clear about the obligations of the transferor, at least on paper.215
Compared with the consultation document to the European Union, at least
with respect to data protection, Microsoft seems to be of the view that Canada has a
more appropriate scheme at present. This may be less than surprising given that
Canada is one, albeit large and diverse, country compared with the EU’s 27 Member States, but noteworthy nonetheless. The current fragmented European Data Retention scheme was singled out as one of the most crucial impediments to widespread could adoption.216 IBM has stated that a “lack of visibility and control, concerns about the protection of sensitive information and storage of regulated information in a shared, externally managed environment”217 are major concerns and
will be stopping wide-spread open cloud-computing solutions for a few years yet.
For now, a “trust but verify” model is being promulgated by IBM. On the topic of
breach notification, telecommunications providers such as Bell Canada have been
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outspoken in their views against mandatory regulations.218 These views are shared
by the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and relate to a fear of an over-flooding of
notices (and resulting consumer fatigue in this respect).
Industry generally advocates that the current framework is not entirely incapable of handling privacy in cloud computing but needs to be harmonized and become clearer on the obligations of CSPs. New initiatives may also be needed and
some of these are currently well on the way to becoming formulated.219

(d) Differences and Common Ground
As the preceding analysis has described, there are distinct differences but also
common ground between Canada and the EU regarding data protection in the
Cloud. This section will distill and analyze the main differences as well as the main
points of commonality between Canada and the EU, and what these potentially entail for data protection in the Cloud.
Current legal frameworks are not suited to the Cloud: Neither the Canadian
nor the European Union framework is currently able to properly address the challenges that the Cloud’s inherent (and thus unalterable) features carry with them.
Virtualization, and ad hoc data access and storage in multiple locations are not
reconcilable with the Article 25 prohibition on the extra-EU transfer of personal
data. They are also not easily reconciled with “openness” and “transparency” principles underlying PIPEDA. It will be difficult for a cloud customer to be open with
respect to his practices vis-a-vis individuals, whose personal information she controls, if she does not know the CSPs, or their CSPs’ practices (where multiple CSPs
are used). The Directive’s distinction between “controller” and “processor” may
not be a feasible way in which to divide up responsibility for personal data in the
Cloud and could result in uncertainty as to the ultimate responsibility for the data.
The controller may not know about the CSPs practices at any given time because
the services are delivered ad hoc but would still be “on the hook” for potential
discrepancies. Bad for the customer, and possibly bad for the data subject’s pri-
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vacy, but good for the CSP. On the other hand, if CSPs were to be the “controller”
of the data in a customer-CSP relationship (and not where individuals transact directly with the CSP or where the CSP acts outside of the initial processing relationship), too much of the responsibility would lie with them because the CSP does not
have the relationship with the data subjects, including knowing, or being able to
control, the purposes behind the collection of the data. At a minimum, however,
both customer and CSP should be able to know into which category they fall. The
Canadian OPC has offered some more guidance and how PIPEDA will apply to the
CSP and the customer in its view, but the legislation itself is also not entirely clear
on this point.
Government in the European Union and Canada is seeking more access to
and control of personal data: The Canadian government is seeking to pass legislation to make lawful interception less cumbersome. The EU has passed data retention rules and countries within the EU already have means by which to legally
intercept communications without a warrant. The most recent examples of these
efforts are the FRA law in Sweden and the proposed legislation in Canada. This
development is feared by both industry and data protection authorities, as well as
by those concerned with the deterioration of data protection. As we have seen,
threats to personal data by governments may still be the most serious threat to personal information, regardless of the amount of press the wanton privacy policies of
Facebook or Google’s invasive StreetView product have garnered. This continuing
threat will be a deterrent for many businesses and individuals wanting to entrust
their information into the Cloud because increased, even inadvertent, access may
occur in the Cloud by way of these lawful access laws.
The Canadian legal framework is more “cloud-ready” than that of the EU:
From the industry’s perspective, it seems Canada has two distinct advantages regarding its governing legislation. Firstly, unlike the EU framework, PIPEDA allows for transfers to third countries via its organization-to-organization approach
and secondly, its laws are much more harmonized internally as well as in relation to
the United States (albeit with some well-established concerns about the US governments’ lawful access provisions), both parties’ most important trading partner in
this respect.
The EU framework, although solid in its protection of personal information, is
undoubtedly a roadblock for widespread cloud adoption in Europe, both on the customer uptake and the provider side. For one, the transfer restrictions do not work
with the practical application of the public cloud application. Secondly, a lack of
harmonization and resulting lack of foreseeability with respect to lawful access,
data retention and breach notification requirements have industry worried about
compliance where CSPs are situated in another Member State. Regulators and
CSPs are attempting to come up with ways of negotiating around the transfer restrictions to non-adequate countries with agreements like Safe Harbor, BCRs and
model contract clauses, but such a patch-work of a regulatory environment is not
conducive to seamless adoption of a technology.
Canada need not worry about these same restrictions and can focus on the data
protection issues from a more practical perspective. As an example, although the
transparency and openness principles clash with the Cloud model, they are nonetheless principles that do not inherently clash with cloud computing if technological
and business decisions are taken that incorporate privacy into the model itself. In
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Canada, less of the discussion currently revolves around the ability of the legal
framework to cope with the Cloud. Rather, both the Canadian and Ontario Commissioners are aiming at promoting technological solutions (privacy-by-design) and
enforcing the laws vis-a-vis potential privacy outlaws (for example, Facebook and
Google). The OPC has some concerns with the model and shares these with European counterparts but after an analysis of the material, it cannot be said that the
worries are as far reaching as in Germany where, for example, the BDFI has voiced
grave concerns with the model’s ability to comply full-stop.220 The Ontario Commissioner noted a related but lesser concern that if understanding, trust and assessment of the Cloud are not increased, the Cloud may be relegated to handling nonsensitive data,221 rather than being an across-the-board option for data processing.
The Offices of the Canadian and Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioners are taking on a leading role in the quest for a data protective Cloud model:
Canada has taken on a leadership role on the international data protection front, in
particular with respect to digital data stored online. This is evident when looking at
the shear level of activity of the OPC and IPC over the past two years, including
investigating privacy breaches, writing open letter to industry, publishing material
or making proposals at an international level.222 Industry, privacy hawks and regulators all agree that this international cooperation will be crucial to the future of
individuals’ privacy rights online but also to the chances of the Cloud becoming a
viable computing model for the future. Canada’s leadership role may give potential
cloud customers, including the government, the comfort level they require in order
to trust their data to CSPs, even those in other countries. It will also provide comfort to those customers residing elsewhere that in case they trust a CSP with storage
servers in Canada, their data will be protected by virtue of an active data protection
authority. That being said, Canadian Privacy Commissioners recognize (or at least
of the view) that laws will simply not do when it comes to data protection and the
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Peter Schaar, supra, “In this connection, however, the question is raised how data protection and data security can be ensured. It is very hard to capture CC in its pure
form — thus as an open, global model — by the applicable data protection law. If a
data controller decides to have his personal data stored world-wide on dispersed computers, this approach quickly reaches its limits. In the extreme case neither the data
subjects nor the data controller know where and by whom the data are technically
processed. As far as storage capacities and applications (for instance text processing)
are directly made available to the end users via the Web, the customers have hardly any
chance to claim their data protection rights to which they are entitled to according to
European law, at least in instances where the provider offers the service from a third
country (for example the US). But also when domestic companies award orders related
to data processing to providers of Cloud Services many questions are raised. Admittedly, the responsibility relating to data protection law normally remains with the data
controller, thus with the principal. The Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG) and the
European Data Protection Directive contain detailed provisions for such a case, however, as to CC (at least in its pure form), it is hardly possible to comply with these
provisions.”
221 Privacy by Design, supra, at 19.
222 See discussion infra and e.g. Cloud Computing & the Canadian Environment, supra at
4.
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Cloud. What is needed are technological solutions and then laws as a supplement
and enforcement tool.
Canadian and European laws continue to evolve alongside each other: All
differences aside, Canadian and European legislation is more similar than not. In
both cases, authorities will take jurisdiction where personal data of citizens and/or
residents in being processed, both jurisdictions continue to pursue a more paternalistic approach to privacy, and both systems are very careful in terms of personal
information being processed outside of their respective jurisdictions. Bill C-29 and
the 2009 e-privacy Directive introducing breach notification requirements, is yet
another example of a parallel development.
For industry it is obviously helpful to have similar requirements in their markets in case of wide-scale breaches where personal data from more than one region
is compromised. In a cloud environment, a CSP may be hosting the information of
data subjects from many different parts of the world, and compliance with nonharmonized and discrepant notification laws would be cumbersome to say the least.
As we have seen, industry generally favours a self-regulating approach, but it
seems that breach notification will become part of the general responsibilities of
cloud providers, no matter where they are doing business. Bill C-29 strikes a balance between the call for mandatory breach notification and industry’s wishes in
that it neither allows for a private right of action nor does it impose clear penalties
for non-compliance.
If Bill C-30 becomes a reality in Canada in some form or another, it will move
Canada another step closer to (and perhaps even beyond) European legal interception laws, for better or for worse. From a privacy hawk’s as well as industry’s point
of view, the data retention requirement is not a welcome development but would
nonetheless be a step toward a more harmonized regulatory landscape, which is
something industry is striving for.
So far Canada has a well-recognized and active data protection authority,
which is leading the way on an international as well as domestic level. Canada’s
privacy laws strike a balance between the American and EU approaches as they are
neither based on a self-regulating nor restrictive model of data protection (i.e. it
permits data transfers but sets strict guidelines for doing so). Another advantage is
that PIPEDA is considered to offer “adequate” protection under EU law. This allows a potential EU cloud customer to transfer personal data to a Canadian-based
CSP without the fear of being offside Article 25 of the Directive.
The European Union Governments are farther along in the development of
Cloud computing strategies:Both regions believe in the promise of the Cloud.223
Both regions also seem to be confident in the benefits, both current and future, of
pursuing a cloud-friendly regulatory environment, or, as in the case of the Canadian
Privacy Commissioners and European Data Protection Authorities, technological
solutions to ensure privacy in the Cloud. For businesses within the respective re223

In fact, there are not many voices opting for a “no-go” option. Even critics like
Jonathan Zittrain, e.g. in Jonathan Zittrain, “Lost in the Cloud” (July 19, 2009) The
New York Times, online: The New York Times<http://www.ny–
times.com/2009/07/20/opinion/20zittrain.html> are not advocating to not use the Cloud
model but just warning of its dangers and the need to develop and establish appropriate
safeguards.
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gions, it is seen as a way of cutting costs and achieving increased efficiencies. Not
only that, both regions would like to viewed as feasible locations for CSPs to set up
business, and where businesses (and consumers) would feel comfortable storing
their personal data from an online privacy standpoint. However, Europe has a more
well-defined and advocated cloud strategy. The Canadian government has been relatively slower (or cautious) in this respect. This wait-and-see approach has the advantage of avoiding hasty decisions from a data protection perspective but may
prevent Canada from being at the forefront of developing appropriate data protection solutions even though it is regarded by many as being a prime location for the
Cloud industry to prosper, especially in terms of constructing large-scale server
parks in its Arctic North.

IV. FUTURE OUTLOOK
The Cloud promises many benefits but it carries with it many threats to personal information. Some of the threats come from hackers, others from industry’s
use, and others yet stem from the government’s lawful access. All of these threats
exist in the traditional environment but are exacerbated in the Cloud. Regulators,
industry and data protection authorities have a major task ahead of them. They
must make a square block fit a round hole. That is, the model that (almost) everyone seems to want to use must be reconciled with a framework that protects a fundamental right that is being threatened by that very technology. This reconciliation
should also satisfy the competing rationalities referred to earlier. It is therefore not
an easy task but one that could be achieved through choosing to follow along a
number of different paths, some of which may be more desirable than others:
Option 1 would be that the Cloud model is more or less abandoned, used to a
very limited extent or at the most used only where non-sensitive data is being transferred within private cloud applications. We have seen examples only to a limited
extent but this is a concern that was voiced by Ontario’s Commissioner. If there is
no trust in the Cloud, then it unlikely that critical financial information or health or
government records would be processed this way. Given the promise of the technology, however, this is an unlikely outcome.
Option 2 would be to reevaluate the values that stand in conflict with the
model. In this case, regulators would engage in a simple cost-benefit analysis resulting in the conclusion that using the Cloud outweighs the harm caused to individuals’ privacy rights and write laws so that the model can be used. There have
been no proposals in this regard but as we have seen, certain comments from industry players have hinted that this should be considered.
Option 3 stops short of abandoning core values. Instead, it aims to rethink,
reinterpret or add to current laws, without changing the underlying principles. This
approach is evident in publications from the OPC and IPC, and targeted breach
notification laws or policies clarifying the Article 25 prohibitions would be an example of this approach.
Lastly, Option 4 would be to change the environment the technology is operating in so that the model suits the laws and values, and to write laws that encourage
(or demand) use of that technology. This approach imagines the use of, for example, PETs and underlies, inter alia, the privacy-by-design approach advocated by
the Ontario Commissioner. Given the realities of today’s computing environment,
it is perhaps the most promising way to satisfy privacy concerns as well as ensuring
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the exploitation of new computing techniques.
2012 will likely provide us with an indication as to which options will be pursued and to what extent, in particular in response to the EU Proposal. Canada’s
privacy laws are also under review but, as noted, not as much progress has been
made in 2011 as had been expected. Given that it is expected that the cloud computing industry will grow to $148.8 billion224 by 2014, it naturally in many stakeholders’ interests that clarity is provided swiftly.

CONCLUSION
Cloud computing is not a flavour-of-the-month technology and the protection
of personal information is a core interest, notwithstanding a potential shift in what
we consider to being “private” or how much information people are willing to
share. The two concepts are clashing conceptually and in practice, and regulators,
privacy watchdogs and industry are all grappling with how to reconcile an emerging, highly profitable technology with a fundamental right. Some believe that privacy and the Cloud are not at odds with each other per se but that it will require the
re-thinking of how to protect privacy online and discovering and encouraging innovative technological solutions and architectures. Others, however, do not share this
can-do attitude and hold the view that the model is inherently incompatible with the
principles data protection laws were built upon. Others yet are of the view that the
Cloud is the technological model of the future and that privacy ideals have changed
so that current laws — and principles — need to be adjusted so that the benefits of
the Cloud can be reaped.
We have seen that Canada and the European Union along with its Member
States have many things in common with respect to the principles of the protection
of personal data. This is also evident in the shared public wariness of warrantless
government access to communications. Notwithstanding these similarities, the
EU’s size and lack of harmonization, restrictions on data transfers, controversial
and inconsistently applied data retention and lawful access laws, make it quite a
tough and uncertain legal landscape for CSPs and their potential customers. Reconciling privacy and cloud computing is also a challenge in Canada, but this process
seems to be at least capable of being moved forward more effectively under the
current legal and regulatory environment, although the Canadian Government’s
stalled digital strategy is putting this into question to a certain extent. 2012 will
provide some answers whether this in fact will hold true and it will be very worthwhile for all stakeholders here to keep a close watch on the discussions ahead, in
particular the views in response to the EU Proposal for a new EU data protection
framework.
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“Cloud to cause paradigm shift and transform businesses KPMG report on ‘The CloudChanging the Business Ecosystem’”, KPMG online: <http://www.kpmg
.com/IN/en/Press%20Release/Press_Release_The_Cloud_Changing_the_Business_
Ecosystem.pdf>.
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Appendix 1 — List of Acronyms
BCR — Binding Corporate Rules
BDFI — German Data Protection Authority
CSP — Cloud Service Provider, provider of cloud computing services
DPA — Data Protection Authority
ENISA — European Network and Information Security Society
EU — European Union
IaaS — Infrastructure as a Service
ICT — Information and Communications Technology
ISP — Internet Service Provider
IPC — Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario
OPC — Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
PaaS — Platform as a Service
PETs — Privacy enhancing technologies
PIPEDA — Personal Information Protection and Electronics Documents Act
SaaS — Software as a Service

